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THE  EXTRAORDINARY  STRENGTH of residential  construction  in 1978 
(2.02 million  starts  for the year) and  the relatively  small  downturn  in the 
first  half of 1979 (1.75 million  starts  at a seasonally  adjusted  annual  rate, 
including  1.92 million starts  for June) has surprised  many economists. 
Most analysts  had anticipated  that high interest  rates  on mortgages,  high 
and rapidly  rising  housing  prices,  and slow economic  growth  would  pro- 
duce a substantial  cyclical decline  in housing.  Various  factors,  however, 
may have been working  to offset this usual cyclical  scenario.  The transi- 
tion of the "baby  boom" generation  to a home-buying  age and the in- 
creased  appeal  of home  purchase  for investment  purposes  may  have  raised 
the demand  for housing.  The introduction  of money-market  certificates 
(MMCs) in June 1978 for banks  and  thrift  institutions  and  the increased 
activity  (mortgage  commitments  and purchases  and Federal  Home Loan 
Bank advances) by secondary  market  agencies  may have increased  the 
availability  and  reduced  the  price  of mortgage  credit. 
Our  results  indicate  that  the introduction  of the MMCs  in June 1978 is 
the primary  reason  for the strength  in housing  investment  during  1978- 
79. High levels of secondary  market  activity  by federal  agencies  also in- 
creased housing starts during 1978, but by relatively small amounts. 
Demographic  factors,  measured  by the exceptionally  high  rates  of house- 
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hold  formation, provided an important impetus to  home building, but 
these factors had been positive for several years, and thus do not explain 
the unusual cyclical strength during 1978-79.  In a similar way, while the 
appeal of home purchase for investment purposes is high, it has not sig- 
nificantly accelerated in the past year. Indeed, while the data show a sub- 
stantial and continuing trend toward home ownership, they provide little 
evidence of an acceleration in this trend since 1960, contrary to ancedotal 
analysis. 
We first review the conventional wisdom concerning the causes of the 
housing cycle and recent government policy responses to that cycle. We 
next outline a theoretical framework of the housing, mortgage, and deposit 
sectors and provide a set of estimated equations. We then present a simu- 
lation analysis of each individual equation and the full set of model inter- 
actions that have occurred from 1978:3 to 1979:2.  Finally, we summarize 
the results and the policy implications of our findings. 
Historical View 
Cyclical instability has been a major characteristic of the residential 
construction industry since World War II. During this period, seven short- 
term cycles have occurred in new production, on the average of one every 
three and a half years. The average decline (or rise)  in activity, as mea- 
sured by the percentage change in housing starts from peak to trough (or 
vice versa) has been approximately 40 percent. The decline in residential 
construction was especially severe in 1974-75,  when the cyclical change 
in housing starts exceeded 80 percent. But table 1 shows that, compared 
with other major cycles of the postwar period, this fluctuation was really 
just one more episode of the longer term pattern of instability. 
This extreme volatility of the housing sector and the importance of the 
housing cycle to macroeconomic  stability has stimulated substantial re- 
search into the causes of the short-term cycle in residential construction, 
and has led the federal governiment  to seek stabilizing policies. The aca- 
demic research can be summarized by a quotation from one of the key 
studies of the housing finance system: 
The greater  impact  of monetary  stringency  on housing than on the rest of the 
economy apparently  is due mainly to a capital rationing  effect, resulting  from 
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Table  1. Short-Term  Cycles  in Residential  Construction,  1953:  3-1977:4a 
Number  of 
Year  and  Turniing  point  housinig  uniits  Cyclical  change 
quarter  in cycle  (thousands)b  (percent)o 
1953:3  Trough  1,235  32.4 
1954:4  Peak  1,732 
-49.9 
1958:1  Trough  1,074  41.4 
1958:4  Peak  1,647 
-51.9 
1960:4  Trough  987  48.3 
1963:3  Peak  1,676 
-59.0 
1966:4  Trough  912  55.2 
1969:1  Peak  1,608 
-24.3 
1970:1  Trough  1,259 
1972:1  Peak  2,487  65.6 
-88.3 
1975:1  Trough  963  74.7 
1977:4  Peak  2,111 
Source: See appendix. 
a. The series is all privately owned housing starts, excluding nmobile  homes. 
b. The data are seasonally adjusted at an anniual  rate by the authtlors,  using X-11, method II. 
c.  The series is adjusted for a  time trend before computing percentage changes. Percentage changes 
are calculated  as thie  change in housing starts divided by the average of the values for the peak and trough. 
credit, and perhaps  also to an interest  rate effect, reflecting  a greater  interest 
elasticity  of housing  demand  than of demand  generally.1 
A more recent study by the Federal Reserve Board concurs with this view: 
There is general  agreement  that one of the primary,  if not the primary,  deter- 
minant  of this cyclical pattern  is the similar  pattern  that holds with respect  to 
a critical  input  in the residential  construction  process: the supply  of mortgage 
credit.2 
This explanation of the short-run housing cycle in terms of mortgage 
availability (and to a lesser extent, mortgage cost)  has had a major in- 
1. Irwin Friend, "Summary  and Reconmmendations,"  in Friend, dir., Study of the 
Savings  and Loan Industry,  submitted  to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, vol. 1 
(Government  Printing  Office, 1970), p. 8. 
2.  James B. Burnham,  "Private  Financial Institutions and the Residential Mort- 
gage Cycle, with Particular  Reference to the Savings and Loan Industry,"  in Board 
of  Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Ways To Moderate Fluctiuations  in 
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fluence  on public  policy  toward  housing  markets.  Since  the late 1960s, the 
federal  government  has made  a substantial  effort  to moderate  the fluctua- 
tions in residential  construction.  A number  of government  agencies  and 
quasi-government  agencies  have been initiated  or redirected  in the past 
ten years toward  this end. These agencies  include the Government  Na- 
tional Mortgage  Association (GNMA), the Federal  National Mortgage 
Association (FNMA), the Federal  Home Loan Mortgage  Corporation 
(FHLMC), and the Federal  Home Loan Bank  Board (FHLBB). While 
these agencies  have a number  of additional  functions, each has been 
closely involved in implementing  countercyclical  policies designed to 
stabilize  the mortgage  and housing  markets.3  In 1978, FNMA, FHLMC, 
and FHLBB  showed  an extraordinarily  large increase  in activity,  adding 
nearly $40 billion in mortgage  commitments  and advances.  This com- 
pares  with about  $20 billion added  in 1977. 
Until May 1978, the activities  of these agencies  were the prime  mech- 
anism  for countercyclical  policies. In June 1978, there  was a substantial 
modification  of the Regulation  Q ceilings on interest  rates;  this change 
allowed  thrift  institutions  and commercial  banks  to issue a new type of 
deposit  certificate  (referred  to here as the MMC) with an interest  rate 
tied  to the  rate  on six-month  Treasury  bills.  The certificate  has a six-month 
life and  a minimum  denomination  of $10,000. Until  March  1979, institu- 
tions could compound  interest  on the certificate,  and thrift institutions 
could  pay a premium  of a quarter  of 1 percent  over  the rate  allowed  com- 
mercial  banks.  In March 1979, these certificates  were modified  to make 
them  somewhat  less attractive  to savers.  The compounding  of interest  was 
eliminated  and  so was the differential  between  thrift  institutions  and  com- 
mercial  banks  when  the rate  on six-month  Treasury  bills exceeded  9 per- 
cent. These modifications  were  made  because  the large  volume  of money 
channeled  into these certificates  had begun  to squeeze  the profit  margins 
of the thrift  institutions.  Additional  modifications  in Regulation  Q ceil- 
ings  were  made  in July 1979 to increase  further  the ability  of institutions 
to pay  market  rates  to small  savers. 
The modifications  of Regulation  Q (and the administration's  proposal 
for a gradual  but  complete  removal  of the ceilings) are  designed  to enable 
3.  See Dwight M. Jaffee and Kenneth T. Rosen, "Estimates  of the Effectiveness 
of Stabilization  Policies for the Mortgage  and Housing Markets,"  Journal  of Finance, 
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thrift  institutions  to have  a chance  to compete  for households'  savings  and 
thus  to become  less susceptible  to the withdrawal  of savings  that  has oc- 
curred  during  periods  of tight  money (disintermediation).  This reduction 
in the instability  of flows of deposits  will, in turn,  reduce  the instability 
in the availability  of credit  to housing  and  mitigate  the fluctuations  in resi- 
dential  construction.  In addition  to the improvement  in the efficiency  of 
the housing  finance  system,  the removal  of ceilings  on interest  rates  will 
allow the small saver  to receive  a more competitive  return.  The changes 
that were  made  in July 1979 were largely  a responsive  to intense  lobby- 
ing pressure  by consumer  and other  groups  to improve  the equity  of the 
deposit  regulations. 
We will now develop the theoretical  background,  specification,  and 
estimation  of a small  model  of the housing,  mortgage,  and  deposit  sectors 
of the U.S. economy.  There are five main estimated  relationships  in the 
model to explain the stock-level demand for home ownership,  single- 
family  housing  starts,  multifamily  housing  starts,  the interest  rate  on mort- 
gages,  and  the deposit  flows  of thrift  institutions.  The model  has been  kept 
small,  particularly  in the reduced-form  treatment  of the mortgage  sector, 
so that  it would  be manageable  and readily  understandable  in a paper  of 
this length.  Reported  in a later section are simulation  experiments  with 
the  model,  which  relate  to the effects  on housing  market  activity  of MMCs 
and  the activity  of federal  agencies  in the mortgage  market. 
The equations  were estimated  using  quarterly  data,  beginning  with  the 
earliest period allowed by the data for each equation and ending in 
1978:2. Single-equation  simulations  are provided  below (with dynamic 
feedback  for lagged  dependent  variables)  for each equation  from 1978:3 
to 1979:2 to test for changes  in behavior  during  this period. 
Housing  Markets 
We begin  with a theory and three equations  for the housing  sector  of 
the model.  Recent  surveys  of models  of the housing  sector  indicate  that, 
while  a set of common  variables  is often  used,  no single  or uniform  econo- 
metric  specification  is widely  accepted.4  As a result,  it is important  to de- 338  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
velop  first  the theoretical  structure  of the model  of the housing,  mortgage, 
and deposit  sectors  that we intend  to estimate  and simulate. 
A measurement  problem  arises at the outset because  housing can be 
measured  as either  the number  of units  or as the real  value  of the units.  A 
major  advantage  of focusing  on the former  is the existence  of accounting 
identities  that  can be derived  for households,  housing  starts,  vacant  units, 
and existing  stocks.  A major  disadvantage  is that quality  changes  in the 
housing stock are disregarded.  Given the difficulty  in adjusting  house 
prices  for quality  over time and the advantages  of integrating  the demo- 
graphic  analysis,  we have chosen to focus our analysis  on the number  of 
units  demanded  and supplied. 
Our  overall  theoretical  structure  for the housing  market  distinguishes 
stock-level  and  flow-level  decisionmaking  and  emphasizes  special  features 
of the equations  for single-family  and  multifamily  housing  starts.  Figure  1 
provides  a flow  diagram  of the internal  structure  of this  housing  model.  As 
shown, the model fits a Marshallian  demand-supply  structure,  but with 
some complexity  because of the interrelationships  of stocks and flows, 
and the special  feature  of the single-family  and multifamily  submarkets. 
The demand  function  for the stock concerns  decisions  on household 
formation  as the first  step and  decisions  on tenure  choice (whether  to own 
or rent) as the second  step. The supply  function  for the stock is based  on 
perpetual  inventory  principles  with the current  stock determined  as the 
sum  of newly  constructed  units and the existing  stock surviving  from the 
preceding  period.  The number  of vacant  units  is then defined  as the stock 
supply  minus  demand.  Rents and  house  prices  are also determined  by this 
stock-level,  demand-supply  balance. 
4.  See Gary Fromm, "Econometric  Models of the Residential Construction  Sec- 
tor: A Comparison,"  in R. Bruce Ricks, ed., National Housing Models: Application 
of Econometric Techniques to Problems of Housing Research (Lexington, 1973), 
pp. 125-34; Martin S. Geisel, "Housing and Residential Construction: A Survey of 
Econometric Studies" (Carnegie-Mellon University, Graduate School of Industrial 
Administration,  September 1972); Leo Grebler and Sherman J. Maisel, "Determi- 
nants of Residential  Construction: A Review of Present Knowledge," in Daniel B. 
Suits and others, Impacts of  Monetary Policy, prepared for the Commission on 
Money and Credit (Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 475-620;  and James Kearl, Kenneth 
Rosen, and Craig Swan, "Relationships  Between the Mortgage Instruments,  the De- 
mand for Housing and Mortgage  Credit: A Review of Empirical  Studies,"  in Franco 
Modigliani and Donald Lessard, eds., New Mortgage Designs for Stable Housing in 
an Inflationary  Environment,  Conference Series, 14 (Federal Reserve Bank of Bos- 
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Figure  1. Internal  Structure  of the Model  for the Housing  Market 
Rents, 
.  ~~~~house  prices, 
vacant units 
Stock-level  __  Stock-level 
Flow-level  Flowv-level 
demand  supply 
Linkages to the miarket  for mutltifamiily  units 
Linkages  to the market  for single-f  ainily uinits 
Linkages  to both mnarkets 
a. Not shown  are  exogenous  forces from demographic  factors, capital markets, and the macroeconomy. 
Housing  starts  are  determined  as  the  result  of  decisions  on  flows.  In 
principle,  these decisions  arise  from both demand  and supply  factors.  In 
fact,  however,  institutional  considerations  indicate  that  only  one  side  of 
the  market  reflects  active  behavioral  decisions.  The  demand  side  deter- 
mines  housing  starts in the market  for single-family  units,  while  the supply 
side  determines  starts in  the  market  for  multifamily  units. 
Single-family  housing  starts are determined  by demand  in the model 
because the majority  of single-family  units are now custom-built,  self- 
built,  or directly  contracted  in some other  manner.  The supply  of single- 
family starts is, moreover,  well approximated  by an infinitely elastic 340  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
schedule.5  Indeed,  for this  reason,  construction  resources  flow  rapidly  into 
and out of this sector, corresponding  to fluctuations  in demand,  while 
vacancy  rates  are low and stable. 
Multifamily  housing  starts  are determined  by supply  in the model,  re- 
flecting  the profit  opportunities  of developer-construction  firms.  Demand 
factors influence  multifamily  housing starts through  stock-level forces, 
whereby  potential  renters  signal their demand  by bidding  up rents and 
eliminating  vacant  units.  Multifamily  housing  starts  are then determined 
by the response  of the construction  industry  to these signals.  Flow-level 
demand  forces  would  operate  directly  in this market  only if the potential 
occupants  ordered  their  units.  This clearly  is not the case for rental  apart- 
ments,  and  even multifamily  condominium  units  typically  are  built  specu- 
latively  without  orders  before  production. 
STOCK-LEVEL  DEMAND 
Our starting  point is the demographic  demand  for housing  units. It is 
derived  from  the total population,  from  its age distribution,  and from  the 
way in which  the population  groups  itself into household  units. For any 
short-  or medium-term  national  analysis,  both the population  and its age 
distribution  are  known  with a high  degree  of precision.  The translation  of 
the age distribution  of the population  into housing  demand,  while  subject 
to uncertainty  resulting  from the forces that influence  household  forma- 
tion,  is still  fairly  predictable  in the short  run. 
Specifically,  the  impact  of the baby  boom  on the  housing  and  other  mar- 
kets could have been generally  anticipated  by an analysis  that included 
demographic  factors.  Table 2 shows the startling  but highly predictable 
changes  in the age distribution  that occurred  in the 1970s. The dramatic 
increase  in the population  aged 18 to 34 has led (and will continue  to 
lead) to a large  increase  in housing  demand;  in particular,  as people  move 
into the group aged 25 to 34, they raise the demand for housing for 
owner-occupancy. 
Not only has the population  in the age group  of the "first  housing  unit" 
5.  See Craig Swan, "Labor and Material Requirements for Housing," BPEA, 
2:1971, pp. 347-77; and William E. Gibson, "Protecting  Homebuilding  from Restric- 
tive Credit  Conditions,"  BPEA, 3:1973, pp. 647-9 1. Dwight M. Jaffee and Kenneth T. Rosen  341 
Table  2. Change  in the Age Distribution  of the Population,  1970-78 
Population  (thousands)  Chlange,  1970-78 
Number 
Age group  April 1, 1970  July 1, 1978  (thousands)  Percent 
All ages  204,335  218,548  14,213  7.0 
Under 5  17,163  15,361  -1,801  -10.5 
5-13  36,675  31,378  -5,297  -14.4 
14-17  15,854  16,639  785  4.9 
18-24  24,455  28,944  4,489  18.4 
25-34  25,146  33,936  8,791  35.0 
35-44  23,214  24,383  1,170  5.0 
45-54  23,254  23,184  -70  -0.3 
55-64  18,603  20,668  2,066  11.1 
65 and over  19,972  24,054  4,082  20.4 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current  Populationi  Reports,  series P-20, no. 336, "Population Profile 
of the United States: 1978" (Government Printing Office, 1979), table 6. 
category  grown dramatically,  but, more generally,  the propensity  of the 
population  to group itself into housing  units has expanded  greatly.  The 
link between  population  and  housing  units  is the "household,"  defined  by 
the U.S. Bureau  of the Census  as a group  of individuals  residing  in shared 
living quarters.  Thus the total number  of households,  technically  "pri- 
mary"  households,  is identical  in concept  to the total number  of occupied 
housing units. The formal accounting  translation  from population to 
households  is the "headship"  rate, defined  as the ratio of the number  of 
households  to the corresponding  population  aggregate.  Rising headship 
rates thus indicate  a demand  for housing  that is expanding  beyond the 
levels based on population  growth  alone. 
Table 3 shows  the headship  rates  for four age categories,  and  it can be 
seen that the rate for each age category  grows significantly  during  the 
period.  Most important,  between 1960 and 1978, the headship  rate for 
ages 25 to 34 grows  by over 7 percentage  points, and for ages under  25 
by almost  5 percentage  points. 
These rising headship  rates are interesting  phenomena.  Hickman  de- 
veloped a model that explains  the change  in aggregate  households  as a 
function  of the age structure  and  size of the population  and  of real  income 
growth.  Maisel analyzed  the 1950s data  with a model  that  focuses on the 342  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1979 
Table  3. Headship  Rates, by Age of Head of Household,  1960-78% 
Proportion 
Age of head 
Year  Under  25  25-34  35-64  Over  64 
1960  0.106  0.429  0.516  0.565 
1961  0.106  0.435  0.519  0.558 
1962  0.110  0.440  0.515  0.590 
1963  0.104  0.439  0.517  0.591 
1964  0.107  0.440  0.521  0.586 
1965  0.113  0.448  0.524  0.594 
1966  0.114  0.450  0.526  0.601 
1967  0.112  0.457  0.527  0.601 
1968  0.117  0.452  0.535  0.613 
1969  0.120  0.468  0.536  0.615 
1970  0.122  0.471  0.538  0.615 
1971  0.128  0.469  0.543  0.620 
1972  0.138  0.473  0.540  0.634 
1973  0.143  0.480  0.543  0.631 
1974  0.150  0.487  0.542  0.636 
1975  0.147  0.489  0.544  0.636 
1976  0.146  0.489  0.550  0.645 
1977  0.147  0.493  0.553  0.630 
1978  0.152  0.501  0.554  0.633 
Sources: Bureau of the Census, Currenit  Population  Reports, series P-20, Population Characteristics  and 
P-25, Population Estimates and Projections, various issues. 
a.  The headship rate is the ratio of the number of heads of households in an age group to the corres- 
ponding population aggregate. 
number  of marriages  and the relationship  of the marriage  rate  to the un- 
employment  rate.6 
Another  key factor  in the rise  of headship  rates  is that  large  numbers  of 
people  have opted,  because  of economic  and sociological  forces, to form 
primary  individual  households  when they previously  would have been 
submembers  of family  households.  These primary  individual  households 
result  from  young  persons  setting  up their  own  households,  delaying  mar- 
6. See Bert G. Hickman, 'What Became of the Building  Cycle?"  in Paul A. David 
and Melvin W. Reder, eds., Nations and Househiolds  in Economic Growth, Essays in 
Honor of Moses Abramovitz (Academic Press, 1974), pp. 291-314; and Sherman  J. 
Maisel, "Changes  in the Rate and Components  of Household Formation,"  Journal  of 
the American Statistical  Association, vol. 55 (June 1960), pp. 268-83.  Incidentally, 
Maisel notes an "Okun's  law" of housebold formation: "that for short-run  fluctua- 
tions, about a three per cent decrease in the number of marriages occurs for each 
one per cent increase  in unemployment"  (p. 274). Dwight M. Jaffee and Kenneth T. Rosen  343 
Table  4. Owner-Occupancy  Rates, by Age of Head and  Type of Household,  1970a 
Proportion 
Age of head  Primary  family  Primary  individual 
of household  households  households 
Under 25  0.251  0.068 
25-34  0.542  0.135 
35-64  0.766  0.426 
65 and over  0.775  0.555 
Source: Bureau of the Census, Cenisus  of Popuilation,  1970, Subject Reports, Final Report  PC (2)-4A, 
Family Composition  (GPO, 1973), table 1. 
a.  The owner-occupancy  rate is the proportion of households that reside in owner-occupied units. 
riage,  or living  with  a person  of the opposite  sex, as well as from  the disso- 
lution  of existing  households  by divorce  and the preference  of surviving 
elderly  spouses  to retain  their  own  independent  living  quarters. 
A shift  in the tenure  choices of households-that is, between  owning 
and  renting-has accompanied  the overall  growth  in household  formation 
and  housing  demand.  Tenure  choice  is a fundamental  decision  on the de- 
mand  side of the housing  market  and is influenced  by a combination  of 
demographic  and economic  factors.  For example,  the propensity  toward 
home ownership  for both family and individual  households  appears  to 
follow a life-cycle  pattern.  Young households,  who tend to have higher 
mobility  rates, less secure job prospects,  lower incomes, and a smaller 
amount  of wealth,  tend to rent housing  units.  As household  heads reach 
the age of thirty,  geographic  mobility  declines,  job prospects  and family 
relationships  become  more secure,  real income  rises, and  wealth  tends  to 
be accumulated.  As a result,  by the age  of thirty-five,  the majority  of heads 
of family  households  and a substantial  minority  of individual  household 
heads  have chosen  to own housing  units.  As table  4 shows,  77 percent  of 
family  heads  aged  35 to 64 own  their  housing  unit  as compared  to 25 per- 
cent under  25 years  of age and 54 percent  aged 25 to 34. 
These basic demographic  tendencies  are complemented  by a set of 
economic  determinants  of tenure  choice. In particular,  the cost of home 
ownership  relative  to the cost of renting  a housing  unit is a crucial  factor 
influencing  the demand  for housing for owner occupancy.  The cost of 
owning a home is dependent  on the purchase  price of a home, the in- 
terest  rate  on the mortgage  loan that  most households  utilize  to purchase 
the home,  the annual  property  tax, and  expenditures  for maintenance  and 
repair.  Two additional  elements  that  have become  increasingly  important 344  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
in recent  years  and reduce  the cost of home ownership  are the potential 
deductibility,  for federal  income  tax purposes,  of property  tax and mort- 
gage interest  payments  and the expected  appreciation  in the value of the 
housing unit. Rosen and Rosen provide a detailed discussion of  the 
measurement  of the housing cost of capital and its influence  on home 
ownership.7 
An additional  factor determining  the demand  for housing  for owner 
occupancy  is the real  permanent  income  of households.  Households  with 
higher  income  tend  to have  a greater  demand  for space  and  social  privacy, 
which  are  normally  associated  with  owner-occupied  units.  In addition,  the 
advantage  of the explicit and implicit  tax subsidies  to home ownership 
makes  this  tenure  choice  more  desirable  for high-income  households. 
A final short-run  determinant  is the availability  of mortgage  credit. 
During  periods  of credit  tightness  the inability  of the household  to obtain 
a mortgage  loan at the  prevailing  interest  rate  on mortgages  can  drastically 
reduce  the incremental  demand  for housing  for owner occupancy.  The 
measurement  of the availability  of mortgage  credit  and its determination 
in the  model  is discussed  in detail  below. 
The  Demand  for  Housing 
The discussion  has indicated  that housing-demand  decisions  occur on 
two levels: first,  the decision concerning  household  formation,  and sec- 
ond, the tenure  choice-to  own or rent. In this paper  we use the data  on 
household  formation  by age and type, but treat  it as exogenously  given.8 
We focus on the tenure  choice.  Data on owner-occupancy  rates (the pro- 
portion  of total  households  that  reside  in owner-occupied  units) are  avail- 
able from the quarterly  Housing  Vacancy Survey  of the Bureau  of the 
Census.  Table  5 presents  the data.  The owner-occupancy  rates,  shown  in 
column  1, indicate  a steady,  but moderate,  upward  trend,  with the aggre- 
gate rate rising  from 62 percent  in 1960 to 65 percent  in 1978. Specifi- 
7.  See Harvey Rosen and Kenneth Rosen, "Federal  Taxes and Homeownership: 
Evidence  from Time Series,"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 88 (forthcoming in 
1980). 
8. In fact, we are currently engaged in a project that will estimate equations to 
explain household formation, with disaggregation  by age of head and type. We sus- 
pect that the omission of endogenous equations for household formation from the 
model will have relatively  minor consequences for the four-quarter  time span of our 
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Table  5. Trends  In Owner-Occupied  Units, 1960-78 
Owner-occupied  units  (thousands) 
Owner-occupancy  Adjusted  Ratio of actual to 
rate (proportion)  Number  numbers  adjusted  number 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1960  0.621  32,909  35,068  0.938 
1961  0.624  33,612  35,679  0.942 
1962  0.630  34,578  36,273  0.953 
1963  0.631  35,018  36,774  0.952 
1964  0.631  35,636  37,286  0.956 
1965  0.633  36,510  37,802  0.966 
1966  0.634  37,158  38,330  0.969 
1967  0.636  37,925  38,985  0.973 
1968  0.639  39,083  39,722  0.984 
1969  0.643  40,193  40,318  0.997 
1970  0.642  40,920  40,940  1.000 
1971  0.642  41,944  41,654  1.007 
1972  0.644  43,231  42,404  1.020 
1973  0.645  44,333  43,128  1.028 
1974  0.646  45,385  43,739  1.038 
1975  0.646  46,212  44,437  1.040 
1976  0.647  47,423  45,199  1.049 
1977  0.648  48,341  45,776  1.056 
1978  0.650  49,726  46,550  1.068 
Sources: For owner-occupancy rates and the number of owner-occupied units, see the appendix. The 
number of owner-occupied units equals the occupancy rate times the number of households. The adjusted 
number of owner-occupied  units is derived from the number of owner-occupied units and the data in table 
4, as described  in the text. 
a.  The adjusted series reflects 1970 owner-occupancy proportions of  eight  household  categories, as 
described  in the text. 
cally,  these  data  show an average  annual  increase  of 0.2 percentage  point 
between 1960 and 1970, and 0.1 percentage  point between 1970 and 
1978.9 
The basically  steady-and,  if anything,  decelerating-trend of owner- 
occupancy  rates  during  the 1970s stands  in strong  contrast  to popular  dis- 
9. The Annual Housing Survey (AHS)  provides an alternative  source of owner- 
occupancy  rates, currently  available for the years 1973 to 1976; its results are close 
to those of the Housing  Vacancy Survey (HVS), not surprisingly  since both are based 
on sampling  procedures  similar to those of the Current Population Survey. Neither 
the AHS nor the HVS data provide evidence of  an accelerating trend in owner- 
occupancy rates since 1971. The decennial Census of Population, a third source of 
data for owner-occupancy  rates, comes close to the HVS values for 1960, but is con- 
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cussions and anecdotal evidence of a "surge toward home ownership." 
Two major factors bridge the difference between our data and this view. 
First, the data used here refer to the number of units, not the value of 
units. Any trend toward larger or higher quality owner-occupied homes 
would not be reflected in our data. Second, an increase in the number of 
second homes would not raise our measure of home ownership. The sec- 
ond home would not affect the owner-occupancy rate if it were unoccu- 
pied and would actually lower the rate if it were rented (and hence renter- 
occupied). 
Changes in the underlying demographic patterns may complicate the 
interpretation of trends in owner occupancy. For one thing, household 
formation has accelerated in the 1970s,  leading to a larger absolute in- 
crease in the number of owner-occupied units, from an annual average of 
800,000  between 1960 and 1970, to 1.1 million between 1970 and 1978. 
Moreover, in any analysis of demographic patterns, the composition of 
households by the age of the head and by type (family or individual) must 
be taken into account. We therefore constructed a series on owner occu- 
pancy that controls  for  the  changing distribution of  the  age  and type 
categories. The HADJ series, shown in column 3 of table 5, records how 
the total number of owner-occupied units would have grown if the rate of 
owner  occupancy  by  each  type  of  household  had  remained  constant. 
Specifically,  this  hypothetical  calculation  assumes  that  the  owner- 
occupancy  rates of  the eight household  categories shown in table 4  is 
identical throughout the period to their actual values in 1970.10  Thus in 
1970,  HADJ  equals,  by  construction,  the  actual  number  of  owner- 
occupied units, HOWN (column 2),  apart from a rounding error. Devia- 
tions between the two series in other years then reflect changes in the 
actual owner-occupancy propensities within the various household cate- 
gories, because these changing propensities are omitted from HADJ  and 
included in HOWN. 
The ratio of HOWN to HADJI,  column 4, thus reveals those changes in 
owner-occupancy rates left after correction for purely demographic shifts. 
The ratio rises quite sharply, from a value of 0.94 in 1960 to almost 1.07 
in  1978,  a much faster pace  than the change in the aggregate owner- 
occupancy rate shown in column 1. In other words, if the age- and type- 
specific occupancy rates of 1970 had been maintained, there would have 
been 3.2 million fewer owner-occupied units in 1978. Indeed, the overall 
10. In the equations  below, quarterly  values for HADJ had to be interpolated;  the 
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owner-occupancy  rate would then have declined, reflecting  the shift in 
the distribution  of households  toward  those age and type categories  that 
have below-average  propensities  to own homes. The rapid increase in 
the ratio of HOWN to HADJ  confirms  the presence  of a trend toward 
home  ownership.  But that  trend  did  not accelerate  between  the 1960s and 
the 1970s. Thus  in estimating  equations  for home ownership  and single- 
family  housing  starts,  we are more cautious  about attributing  any major 
role to financial  investment  incentives  than the conventional  view would 
suggest. 
The estimated  equation  for the stock-level  demand  for owner-occupied 
units  is based  on the  following  stock  adjustment: 
(1)  AHOWN =  g[(ao +  alX)HADJ  -  HOWN-1], 
where  HOWN  is the  number  of owner-occupied  units  and  HADJ is the ad- 
justed number  of units (annual values shown in columns 2  and 3 of 
table 5); and X is a vector of economic  variables  that affect  the owner- 
occupancy rate over time. In the equation,  (aO  +  a,X)  HADJ is viewed 
as the long-run  demand  for owner-occupied  units;  HOWN1  is the num- 
ber of existing  owner-occupied  units; and HOWN  gradually  adjusts  to 
match  the  long-run  demand. 
Three  economic  variables  are specified  for X following  the discussion 
above.  First,  the ratio  of home  ownership  costs  to rental  costs  is measured 
by the ratio  of the home  ownership  component  to the rental  price  compo- 
nent of the consumer  price index, CPIO/CPIR.  As this ratio increases, 
we would  expect a decline  in owner-occupancy  rates.  Second,  the unem- 
ployment  rate, UR, is also expected  to have a negative  impact  on owner 
occupancy.  The third  variable  is a measure  of mortgage  availability,  the 
real value (deflated  by housing  prices) of deposit  flows to thrift  institu- 
tions, ADEP/PH.  It should  have a positive  impact  on owner  occupancy. 
The choice of this measure  for the availability  of mortgage  credit  is dis- 
cussed  in detail  below. Tests were also carried  out on a variable  measur- 
ing the availability  of mortgage  credit from federal agencies,  but it did 
not enter the specification  significantly.  These economic variables are 
scaled  multiplicatively  by HADJ." 
I1.  A more detailed description of the data is provided in the appendix. Here, 
and in subsequent  equations, interest rates are measured in percentage  points; hous- 
ing and demographic  variables,  in thousands  of units; and nominal values, in billions 
of dollars, except as noted. Seasonal dummies are included (but not shown) for each 
equation because many of the series are not seasonally adjusted.  All equations were 
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The equation,  estimated  for the period  from 1964 :1 to 1978 :2, is 
(2)  AHOWN =  constant +  0.88HADJ-0.001(UR)HADJ 
(6.6)  (-2.1) 
-  0.01 [(CPIOc2/CPIR_2)  +  (CPIO3/CPIR_3)]HADJ 
(-2.2) 
+  3. 3(ADEP_1/PHI2)HA  DJ -  0. 50(HOWN_  1), 
(1.9)  (-6.4) 
R2 = 0. 813; Durbin-Watson  =  1. 65; percentage  standard  error =  9. 94; rho =  0. 95. 
The estimated  autocorrelation  coefficient  is 0.95; the high value may re- 
flect  the quarterly  construction  of the  HOWN  and  HADJ data.  Otherwise, 
the equation  fits well and the coefficients  are statistically  significant.  The 
speed of adjustment,  corresponding  to the parameter  g in equation  1, is 
50 percent  a quarter.  Consequently,  the long-run  response  of HOWN to 
changes  in HADJ (corresponding  to coefficient  ao in 1) is 1.76. We ex- 
pected  this coefficient  to be on the order  of 1.0, and find  the larger  value 
disturbing  because  the equation  seems  to fit  the rising  rates  of owner  occu- 
pancy  through  this mechanism.  We also tested variables  such as the ex- 
pected  price appreciation  of owner-occupied  houses, various  tax effects, 
and other  factors  relating  to the investment  returns  to owner  occupancy, 
but, consistent  with the discussion  of trends  in owner-occupancy  rates, 
none of these variables  was significant.  Finally,  the three  economic  vari- 
ables in equation  2 corresponding  to the X vector in 1 have the correct 
signs  and  are  statistically  significant.  However,  the magnitude  of the effect 
of these  variables  on owner-occupancy  rates  is quite  limited. 
SINGLE-FAMILY  HOUSING  STARTS 
Our  specification  of the equation  for single-family  housing  starts  com- 
bines  the  work  of Muth  on stock-adjustment  models  of housing  demand,'2 
first-order  autoregressive  coefficient. The t-statistics  are shown in parentheses  below 
the respective  coefficients.  Either the standard  error or the percentage  standard  error 
(the standard  error  as a percent of the mean of the dependent  variable) is presented, 
as indicated. 
12. See Richard  F. Muth, "The Demand for Non-Farm Housing," in Arnold C. 
Harberger, ed.,  The Demand for  Durable Goods  (University of  Chicago Press, 
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the results  of the previous  section  on the stock-level  demand  for owner- 
occupied  units, and the effect  of credit-availability  factors  that influence 
the exact  cyclical  timing  of housing  starts.  The basic specification  can be 
written  as 
(3)  SSF  =  bo +  b1(AHOSF)  +  b2(KSFI1)  +  b3(VUSFK1)  +  b4(A  VAIL), 
where 
SSF  =  number  of single-family  housing  starts 
HOSF = number  of occupied  single-family  units 
KSF =  number  of existing  single-family  units 
VUSF  =  number  of vacant  single-family  units 
AVAIL  =  vector of variables  representing  mortgage  cost and credit 
availability. 
Each of the first  three variables  reflects  a component  of the demand  for 
single-family  units.  The first  is the net change  in the number  of occupied 
single-family  units,  and  thus  directly  reflects  the net increment  to demand. 
The  second  is a proxy  for the part  of production  that  replaces  depreciated, 
removed,  or converted  units;  the specification  assumes  that  such  replace- 
ment  demand  is proportional  to the outstanding  stock of units.  The third 
variable  stands  for the part  of production  necessary  to bring  the number 
of vacant  units  into line with the desired  level. 
Two modifications  were required  in the actual fitting  procedure  for 
these  three  variables.  First,  the number  of owner-occupied  units,  HOWN, 
replaced  the number of occupied single-family  units, HOSF, because 
quarterly  data on the latter are not available.  Little bias should occur in 
this substitution  because about 95 percent  of owner-occupied  units are 
single-family  units. Second, multicollinearity  between HOWN and our 
measure  of VUSF precluded  a statistically  significant  coefficient  for the 
latter,  and it was dropped  in the final equation. 
In principle,  these effects of the cost and availability  of mortgage 
credit, A  VAIL, should be  already included in  the HOSF term (or 
HOWN, as it is actually  estimated). However, as the discussion  in the 
preceding  section  indicated,  only modest  effects  of credit  availability  ap- 
pear in the HOWN  equation.  In contrast,  we expect-and  at least want 
to test for-a  more significant  impact of mortgage  cost and availability 
on the timing  of housing  starts.  The significant  role that we do find for 
the mortgage  variables  in the housing-start  equation (see below) thus 350  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
indicates  an inadequacy  in the HOWN series for measuring  short-run 
variations  in effective  housing  demand.  In retrospect,  it is not surprising 
that  the housing-start  series  yields  more  information  relating  to short-run 
fluctuations  because  the data are explicitly  in the flow dimension  and are 
actually  collected on a monthly  basis. The HOWN series, in contrast, 
concerns  stock-level  decisions on tenure choice, and is derived  from a 
quarterly  sample  of survey  responses. 
The specific  series  used for the cost of mortgage  credit  is the nominal 
interest  rate  on mortgages,  RM. Tests were  carried  out with  various  mea- 
sures  of real  mortgage  rates,  but the expected  inflation  (or appreciation) 
components  were  not statistically  significant,  again  in line with  the discus- 
sion above  of trends  in home ownership.  The use of the nominal  interest 
rate  on mortgages  by itself is also reasonable  because  this rate  determines 
in part the size of the monthly  mortgage  payment.  Particularly  in an in- 
flationary  setting,  high  monthly  payments  may  present  cash-flow  problems 
that reduce housing demand.  The effects of mortgage  availability  were 
measured  by two variables:  the flow of deposits into thrift institutions, 
ADEP,  deflated  by housing  prices,  PH; and  a measure  of the flow  of mort- 
gage  credit  from  federal  agencies,  FAC, which  is also deflated  by housing 
prices.'3  The choice of these  variables  to measure  mortgage  availability  is 
discussed  in detail  below. 
The equation  for single-family  housing  starts,  estimated  for the period 
from  1965:2 to 1978:2, is'4 
(4)  SSF=constant  +  0.25AHOWN  +  0.02KSF_1-O.001(RM)KSF-1 
(1.6)  (2.2)  (-1.9) 
+  1.35(  DEp)KSF-1  +  1. 16CFACKSF-1, 
(2.1)  PH  /  I  4  PHJ 
R2  =  0. 947; Durbin-Watson  =  1. 97; percentage  standard  error =  7. 37, rho = 0. 80. 
The equation  fits well, with a standard  error  of a little more than 7 per- 
cent.  While  all coefficients  have the expected  sign, several  are on the bor- 
13. The variable FAC is the sum of new mortgage commitments made by the 
Government  National Mortgage Association, the Federal National Mortgage Asso- 
ciation, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, and the net change in 
Federal Home Loan Bank advances. 
14. The AHOWN  series is a four-quarter  average; the ADEPIPH and FAC/PH 
terms are three-  and two-quarter  averages,  respectively;  and KSF-1 is a multiplicative 
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derline  of statistical  significance.  Apparently  this  is the result  of collinear- 
ity with  the variable  for federal  agency  credit,  because  when  it is omitted 
from the specification,  the R2K  changes  very little and all the remaining 
variables  have t-statistics  greater  than 2.0. Alternatively,  the last two 
variables  of the equation  can  be combined  in a single  term,  and  then  again 
the t-statistics  for all coefficients  are above  2.0. We use the equation  pre- 
sented  above  in the simulation  experiments  because  it should  provide  the 
best estimates  of the various  terms,  t-statistics  notwithstanding. 
The magnitudes  of the coefficients  in general  are reasonable.  The co- 
efficient  on AHOWN  is somewhat  low because  it implies  that  only 25 per- 
cent of the change  in the demand  for owner-occupied  units  is reflected  in 
single-family  housing starts.15  The mortgage  interest-rate  term implies 
that an increase  of 1 percentage  point in interest  rates on mortgages  re- 
duces  housing  starts  by about 140,000 units  at annual  rates.  The deposit- 
flow term  implies that a $1 billion increase  in annual  deposit flows in- 
creases  housing  starts  by about 15,000 units at annual  rates.16  A similar 
increase  in the flow  of federal  agency  credit  would  increase  housing  starts 
by about  8,000 units  at annual  rates.17 
MULTIFAMILY  HOUSING  STARTS 
Our  specification  of the equation  for multifamily  starts,  SMF, empha- 
sizes flow-level, supply-side  factors. Specifically,  five factors enter our 
specification  of the supply-side  incentives  to undertake  multifamily  hous- 
ing starts. 
Profit  Margins. Profit  margins  of the  multifamily  construction  industry 
should  be a primary  force determining  multifamily  housing starts.  The 
ideal variable  would compare the discounted  value of anticipated  net 
rental  income  with  the construction  cost.  Unfortunately,  no available  data 
accurately  measure  either  concept.  For rental  income  we used the rental 
component  of the consumer  price  index,  CPIR.  For the construction  cost 
15. The coefficient of the KSF variable cannot be interpreted  as a depreciation 
rate since KSF also serves as the multiplicative  scaling of several other variables in 
the estimated  equation. 
16. Note that 15,000 units evaluated at $60,000 each equals $900 million, which 
is fully consistent  with a $1 billion deposit inflow. 
17. Federal agency credit is less effective than deposit flows as a stimulus to hous- 
ing starts, mainly because our measure of agency credit is based on commitments 
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we experimented  with available  indexes of construction  cost, but-not 
surprisingly,  in view  of the  well-known  problems  with  these  series-it  was 
found  that  the overall  consumer  price  index,  CPIT,  was a more  successful 
variable.  Thus  the  profit  margin  variable  is measured  here  as CPIR/CPIT. 
Mortgage  Interest  Rate. An interest-rate  variable  should  enter  with a 
negative effect in the specification  for two reasons. First, as indicated 
above,  rental  income  should  be discounted  to the  present  as an element  of 
the profit-margin  variable.  Second,  profitability  is affected  by the cost of 
funds (construction  loans) over the long period  that it takes  to complete 
multifamily  construction  projects.  The investor  in such a project  is thus 
critically  sensitive  to the mortgage  rate.  The  term  is specified  as a real  rate: 
the nominal rate minus overall inflation, RM  -  DCPIT,  where DCPIT 
is the  annual  percentage  rate  of change  in CPIT. 
Multifamily Vacancy Rates.  Vacancy  rates, VR,  enter the specifica- 
tion as a disequilibrium  component  in which  a saturated  market  with  high 
vacancy  rates tends to depress multifamily  housing starts, as marginal 
rental  prices  then  fall below the quoted  rental  rates. 
Mortgage  Fund Rationing. Although rationing  effects on mortgage 
funds are often associated  primarily  with single-family  housing  starts,  it 
is also reasonable  to test for such effects  on multifamily  starts.  The situa- 
tion is complicated,  however,  because financing  multifamily  projects  is 
generally  a two-stage  process-first  construction  loans and later long- 
term  financing-and because  a wide variety  of sources  are used for both 
levels of financing.  Thrift institutions  have become the most important 
source  of funds  in this  market,  representing  about  20 percent  of the short- 
term  financing  and about  40 percent  of the long-term  financing  of multi- 
family  projects  in recent  years.  Thus  the  rationing  variable  used  here  is the 
real  flow  of funds  to thrift  institutions,  ADEP/CPIT. 
Outstanding Stock of Multifamily Units.  The size of the outstanding 
stock,  KMF,  serves  as the scaling  (multiplicative)  element  for each  of the 
explanatory  variables  listed  above.  Consequently,  the variable  should  also 
enter  the specification  directly. 
The long production  time necessary  for construction  of multifamily 
housing  should  be expected  to produce  relatively  long lags in the effect  of 
the first four variables.  Experiments  were carried  out with polynomial 
distributed  lags for each variable,  but multicollinearity  made  some of the 
results difficult  to interpret.  Consequently,  simple arithmetic  averages 
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variables  representing  the vacancy  rate, VR, and profit  margin,  CPIR/ 
CPIT (four and three quarters,  respectively),  suggesting  that these fac- 
tors are taken into account early in the planning  period. Shorter,  two- 
period  lags were found for the variables  representing  mortgage  interest 
rate, RM  -  DCPIT,  and availability of mortgage credit, ADEP/CPIT, 
suggesting  that financial  constraints  come into play closer to the actual 
date  of beginning  construction. 
The equation,  estimated  for the period  from 1964:1 to 1978:2, pro- 
vided  the following  results: 
(5)  SMF =  constant +  0.02(CPIR/CPIT)KMF_j 
(3.0) 
-  0.001(RM  -  DCPIT)KMF_1  -  0.0Ol(VR)KMF_K 
(-2.5)  (-3.8) 
+  0.02(ADEP/CPIT)KMF_j  -  0.02KMF_1, 
(3.9)  (-1.8) 
R2  =  0.944; Durbin-Watson  =  2.36; percentage  standard  error =  10.54; rho =  0.80. 
The equation  fits well; all coefficients  have the expected  sign and are sta- 
tistically  significant.  Variables  representing  new mortgage  commitments 
of federal  agencies  and those for subsidized  units  under  programs  admin- 
istered  by the U.S. Department  of Housing  and  Urban  Development  were 
also tested  but did not enter  the specification  significantly. 
The magnitudes  of the coefficients  imply  large  effects  from changes  in 
each  of the key explanatory  variables.  For example,  an increase  of 1 per- 
centage  point in the vacancy  rate and the interest  rate on mortgages  will 
depress  housing  starts  at annual  rates  by 200,000 and 100,000 units,  re- 
spectively.  An increase  of 10 percent  in real rental  prices raises annual 
housing  starts  by over 200,000 units, while an increase  of $1 billion in 
deposit  flows  raises  them  by 16,000 units. 
Mortgage  and  Deposit  Markets 
The cost and availability  of mortgage  credit  clearly  play a critical  role 
in the  model  of activity  in the housing  market  presented  above.  In this  sec- 
tion we focus  on the determinants  of the interest  rate  on mortgages,  as the 
measure  of the cost of mortgage  credit,  and on deposit  flows to thrift  in- 
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cies is the measure  of mortgage  availability.  Because  Regulation  Q ceil- 
ings may influence  both the cost and availability  of mortgage  credit,  and 
particularly  because  the two paths  of influence  lead to offsetting  effects  on 
housing  starts,  we also  analyze  these  interconnections. 
AVAILABILITY  AND  COST  OF  MORTGAGES 
Modeling  the mortgage  market  on a structural  level poses immediate 
problems  because  both demand  and  supply  are  derived  relationships  with 
relatively  rigid ratios linking the mortgage  schedules  to the underlying 
markets.  On the supply  side, depository  institutions,  particularly  thrift  in- 
stitutions,  are the predominant  force in the market.  The supply  of mort- 
gage  funds  thus  moves  in step with the flow of deposit  funds-especially 
for savings and loan associations,  which supply about 50 percent of 
mortgages  for single-family  homes."8  On  the demand  side,  most  borrowers 
find mortgage  credit  necessary  to finance  their  home purchase,  and they 
seek the largest  loan available  based on their collateral.  Thus mortgage 
demand  is tied quite  directly  to the demand  for housing. 
In a framework  of demand-supply  equilibrium  for the mortgage  mar- 
ket, changes  in interest  rates  on mortgages  would  be generated  by fluctu- 
ations in the underlying  markets, specifically  housing activity on the 
demand  side and deposit  flows  on the supply  side. Because  housing  activ- 
ity and deposit  flows  themselves  fluctuate  a great  deal, one would expect 
rather  strong  movements  in the interest  rates  on mortgages  compared  with 
interest  rates  on other  capital-market  instruments  of similar  maturity.  In 
fact, however,  interest rates on mortgages  are sluggish, moving more 
slowly  than  most  other  interest  rates  in the capital  markets.  This behavior 
could be the result of stabilizing  interventions  by federal agencies,  but 
sluggish  movements  in interest  rates  on mortgages  have  been  evident  in the 
United States at least since the beginning  of this century,  long before 
the federal  agencies  existed. Rather,  institutional  and structural  factors 
appear  to be the primary  explanation;  usury  ceilings,  for example,  place 
ceilings  on levels  of mortgage  rates (and, it appears,  floors  also) in a num- 
ber of areas.  Search  theory  suggests  a more fundamental  explanation  in 
18. Recent innovations  in the mortgage  market,  particularly  the issue of mortgage- 
backed bonds, pass-through securities, and secondary market sales of  mortgage 
assets have weakened  the link between deposit flows and mortgage originations for 
thrift institutions.  This "unbundling"  of mortgage  origination  and mortgage-portfolio 
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terms  of price  determination  in overlapping  local markets  with elements 
of monopolistic  competition.  And political considerations  are evident, 
with mortgage  borrowers  representing  a potent force, not only in the 
United  States  but  also  in many  European  countries. 
The sluggish  changes  in interest  rates on mortgages  are evidence  of a 
disequilibrium  element  in the mortgage  market.  When this interest  rate 
does not rise rapidly  in the presence  of excess demand  in the mortgage 
market,  nonprice  rationing  must  be used to allocate  the supply.  The form 
of this rationing  varies, depending  on a variety of factors. In extreme 
cases,  there  are "bare-shelf"  conditions  in which  mortgage  loans are ba- 
sically  not available  on any terms  or at any price.  More commonly,  vari- 
ations  in nonprice  terms  associated  with mortgage  loans play a role. For 
example,  reductions  in loan-to-value  ratios  are common  in such periods; 
they serve  to ration  credit  both by reducing  the amount  loaned to actual 
borrowers  and by eliminating  some would-be borrowers  who require 
loans  with  low down-payments.  Variations  in maturities,  prepayment  pen- 
alties,  and  other  nonprice  terms  can  operate  in a similar  way. 
The measurement  of mortgage  availability  poses a continuing  problem. 
The approach  followed  here  uses deposit  flows  to thrift  institutions  as the 
endogenous  market  measure of availability.  Mortgage credit available 
from  various  federal  agencies  is also used as an exogenous  policy element 
in the equation  for single-family  housing  starts (see equation  4 above). 
In adopting  this method,  we can be quite  confident  that deposit  flows are 
measuring  phenomena  only on the supply  side of the mortgage  market.  In 
principle,  there  could  be feedbacks  on deposit  markets  from  housing  mar- 
kets,  with strong  housing  demand  driving  up interest  rates  on mortgages, 
spilling  over  to higher  deposit  rates,  and  resulting  finally  in higher  deposit 
flows. It seems, however,  that this process operates,  if at all, with long 
lags, and obviously  it cannot operate  with Regulation  Q ceilings deter- 
mining  deposit  rates. 
To be sure,  the use of deposit  flows  to thrift  institutions  as the measure 
of credit  availability  ignores  sources  other than those deposit  flows that 
influence  the disequilibrium  component  of the supply  of mortgage  credit. 
For example,  life insurance  companies,  pension  funds,  mortgage  compa- 
nies, and commercial  banks  have altered  their degree  of penetration  into 
mortgage  markets  at various times, sometimes  reflecting  changes  in the 
differential  between  interest  rates  on mortgages  and  those  on other  invest- 
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gage credit  rationing  over the cycle arises  from disintermediation  out of 
thrift  institutions.  This  is the case  both  because  of the key role of the thrift 
institutions  in the  mortgage  market  and  because  of the highly  cyclical  pat- 
tern  of their  deposit  flows.  The changing  penetration  and  portfolio  adjust- 
ments  of the other  institutions  have occurred  more often in a long-term, 
trend  context,  with  limited  short-term  impacts  on the rationing  of mortgage 
credit. 
The equation  for the interest  rate on mortgages  is specified  in a format 
consistent  with  this disequilibrium  view of the mortgage  market.  Follow- 
ing  the  work  of Jaffee,'9  changes  in the mortgage  interest  rate  are  modeled 
as a partial  adjustment  process: 
(6)  ARM  =  k(RM*  -  RM_  1), 
where  RM is the quoted  interest  rate  on mortgages  and  RM* is the equi- 
librium  value.  The equation  indicates  that the interest  rate on mortgages 
moves  toward  its equilibrium  value,  but only gradually  at a speed  depend- 
ing  on the  size  of the  parameter,  k. 
The equilibrium  value  of the interest  rate  on mortgages,  RM*, is speci- 
fied  in a reduced-form  framework  as a function  of the exogenous  demand 
and  supply  factors  affecting  the  mortgage  market: 
(7)  RM*  =  co +  c,RTB +  c2R3-5 +  c3RAAA +  c4RSL 
+  c5(QDEP)/(PHI  SSF) +  c6(FAC/(PH  SSF), 
where 
RTB =  interest  rate on three-month  Treasury  bills 
R3-5 =  interest  rate on three-  to five-year  government  bonds 
RAAA  =  interest rate on Aaa corporate  bonds (Moody's) 
RSL =  average  effective  deposit  rate  at savings  and  loan associations 
DEP =  level of deposits  at thrift  institutions 
PH =  quality-adjusted  price index for new single-family  homes 
SSF  =  single-family housing starts 
FAC =  sum of  new mortgage commitments issued by  FNMA, 
FHLMC, and GNMA and the net change in outstanding 
FHLBB  advances. 
19. See Dwight M. Jaffee, "An Econometric Model of the Mortgage Market,"  in 
Edward  M. Gramlich  and Dwight M. Jaffee, eds., Savings Deposits, Mortgages, and 
Housing: Stuidies  for the Federal Reserve-MIT-Penn  Economic Model (Lexington, 
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The three  variables,  RTB, R3-5, and  RAAA are interest  rates  on securi- 
ties  of short-,  medium-,  and  long-term  maturities,  respectively.  They enter 
RM* as indicators  of opportunity  cost in both the demand  and supply 
sides  of the market;  they consequently  should  display  strong  and positive 
coefficients. 
The RSL  variable  introduces  a more  novel, and  possibly  controversial, 
element.  The RSL term  is calculated  as total interest  payments  made by 
savings  and  loan associations  on deposits,  divided  by the total deposits  in 
those  associations;  it is thus  the average  effective  interest  rate  on deposits. 
The variable  enters  equation  7 as a cost factor  that is marked  up as thrift 
institutions  change  mortgage  interest  rates in line with changes  in their 
cost of funds.  This specification  creates  a direct  link between  forces that 
change  RSL (such as changes  in Regulation  Q ceilings) and the interest 
rate  on mortgages. 
The last two variables  of 7 represent  forces that affect the demand- 
supply  balance  in the mortgage  market.  The ratio  of net deposit  flows  for 
thrift  institutions  to the value of single-family  housing  starts  should dis- 
play a negative  coefficient  because  rising  deposit  flows or declining  hous- 
ing starts  would indicate  greater  relative  supply  in the mortgage  market 
and  thus  lower  interest  rates  on mortgages.  The final  variable  reflecting  the 
mortgage  commitments  of federal  agencies  should  also  have a negative  co- 
efficient,  as increased  commitments  and advances  place downward  pres- 
sure  on the  interest  rate  on mortgages. 
The estimated  equation  for the interest  rate  on mortgages  is derived  by 
substituting  7 into 6, with  the following  result  for the period  from 1965:3 
to 1978:2:20 
(8)  ARM =  constant +  0.07RTB  +  0.08R3-5  +  0.22RAAA1 
(4.0)  (1.8)  (3.0) 
+  0. 37RSL1  -  1.  4(ADEP)/(PH. SSF) 
(4.1)  (-3.7) 
-  1.3(FAC)/(PH*SSF)  -  0.57RM_1, 
(-2.6)  (-7.6) 
Ra =  0.846; Durbin-Watson  =  1.85; standard  error =  0.076; rho =  0.60. 
The equation  fits  well with a standard  error  of less than 8 basis  points. 
All coefficients  are  statistically  significant  and  correctly  signed.  The speed 
20. The deposit-flow  variable  enters as a three-quarter  distributed  lag. 358  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
of adjustment,  corresponding  to k in equation  6, has the reasonable  value 
of 57 percent  a quarter.  The RSL variable  is highly  significant,  and has a 
coefficient  equal  in magnitude  to the sum  of the coefficients  of the interest 
rates  in the capital  market.  A number  of experiments  were carried  out to 
"shake"  this variable,  but it proved stable. Thus a strong element of 
markup  pricing  over deposit  costs for the interest  rate on mortgages  ap- 
pears  confirmed. 
Because  the  sum  of the  coefficients  on the  four  variables  representing  in- 
terest  rates  is 0.74, a 1 percentage  point  change  in each  of these  rates  would 
cause  the rate  on mortgages  to rise  by 74 basis  points  within  two quarters 
(noting  that  two of the variables  enter  with one-quarter  lags). In the long 
run  the interest  rate on mortgages  would rise by 130 basis points, taking 
into account  the effect  of the lagged  dependent  variable.  It is not surpris- 
ing that  this  long-run  response  ratio  is greater  than  unity  because,  in fact, 
the mortgage  rate is typically  higher  than a weighted  average  of the four 
rates  due to risk  and maturity  factors.  The last two variables  of 8, which 
represent  measures  of the demand-supply  balance  in the mortgage  market, 
are  quite  significant  statistically,  although  the magnitude  of their  effect  on 
the interest  rate on mortgages  is relatively  small.  For example,  a 10 per- 
cent change  in deposit  flows or agency  commitments  would have an im- 
pact  on the order  of 2 basis  points.  Still,  large  changes  in these  ratios  have 
occurred  and may be maintained,  so that the cumulative  effect may be 
appreciable. 
DEPOSIT  FLOWS 
Deposit flows  to thrift  institutions  (savings  and loan associations  and 
mutual  savings  banks) are modeled  as the outcome  of decisions  on port- 
folio allocation  by the household  sector.  Demand-side  influences  by the 
thrift  institutions  themselves  are ignored  because  of the dominant  role of 
Regulation  Q ceilings  over the sample  period.  The approach  used here, 
following  the work  of Rosen,21 distinguishes  between  the flow of deposit 
funds arising  from new saving and the portfolio  reallocation  of existing 
21.  See Kenneth  Rosen, "The  Disintermediation  Function: A Gross Flows Model 
of Savings  Flows to Savings  and Loan Associations,"  Research Memo 23 (Princeton 
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funds that arises from interest rate differentials. A formulation capturing 
these influences  is 
(9)  ADEP  =  do +  [di +  d2(RTB  -  RSL)]SAV 
+  [d3 +  d4(RTB  -  RSL)]DEP1 
+  d5RSL(DEPK1), 
where SA V is personal saving. 
The first  term represents the allocation of personal saving, with the pro- 
portion allocated to deposits of thrift institutions depending in part on in- 
terest rate differentials; thus d2 is expected to be negative. The  second 
term represents  the allocation of existing funds, with the same structure as 
the first term, but with DEP 1 replacing SA V. The last term is introduced 
to account for the "interest credited" component of deposit flows to thrift 
institutions, which is specified as the effective interest rate on  deposits 
times the level of outstanding deposits. The d5 coefficient represents the 
proportion of interest credited that is retained on deposit. 
Based on the previous work of Rosen, the d4 coefficient, representing 
the portfolio reallocation effect, is expected to show the greatest interest- 
rate elasticity. The d2 coefficient, representing the allocation of new sav- 
ing, in contrast, has displayed only a negligible influence. This asymmetry 
emerges because inflows and outflows of gross saving are themselves fre- 
quently asymmetrical. Particularly during periods of  disintermediation, 
gross inflows remain quite stable, with little apparent response to interest 
rates (as reflected in the d,  and d2 coefficients).  In contrast, gross out- 
flows indicate strong responses to interest rates  (approximated here by 
the d3  and d4  coefficients). 
The yield on deposits in 9 is measured by RSL, the average effective 
rate for savings and loan associations. In principle, a marginal rate-that 
is, the deposit rate on the  account category relevant at the margin to 
household decisionmakers-w7ould be preferable, but such a data series is 
not available. Experiments were carried out with approximations besides 
RSL, namely the Regulation Q ceiling rates (both for passbooks and cer- 
tificates) and a mixture used in the MIT-Penn-SSRC econometric model. 
The RSL series was adopted because it fitted the data well and in the same 
way as the alternatives, and also is appropriate both for the d5 term in 9, 
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The results  of estimating  9 for the period  from 1965:2 to 1978:2 are 
(10)  ADEP =  constant +  0. i1SA V-0.  1O(RTB-RSL)DEP1 
(5.5)  (-11.9) 
+  0. 002RSL(DEPi), 
(3.4) 
R2 =0.962;  Durbin-Watson  =  1.92; percentage  standard  error =  14.64; rho =  0.5. 
As expected,  the coefficients  d2  and  d3  in 9 were  not significantly  different 
from  zero, and  they  have  been omitted  from  the final  equation.  The equa- 
tion fits quite  well, with a percentage  standard  error  of less than 15 per- 
cent; the coefficients  are significant  with the correct  signs. The respon- 
siveness  of deposit  flows to the interest  rate, as measured  by the second 
variable  of 10, is large,  with  a change  of 1 percentage  point  in the Treasury 
bill rate (RSL remaining  fixed) causing  a change  of 10 percentage  points 
in the  growth  rate  of deposits.  The coefficient  of the interest-credited  vari- 
able,  the last term  in 10, implies  that about  80 percent  of interest  credited 
is retained  on deposit.22 
Linking  the Deposit,  Mortgage,  and  Housing  Markets 
The estimated  equations  for deposit  flows, ADEP, the interest  rate on 
mortgages,  RM, and  housing  starts,  HS, highlight  the various  links  among 
the sectors  of the model. These variables  are influenced  by interest  rates 
on securities  in the capital  markets,  RCAP, the average  effective  interest 
rate on the deposits  of thrift  institutions,  RLS, and by one another (as 
well as a number  of exogenous  variables).  These linkages  can be seen in 
the  following  summary: 
Dependent  Independent  variable 
variable  RCAP  RSL  ADEP  RM 
ADEP  -  +  ... 
RM  +  +  - 
HS  ...  ...  +  - 
22.  To see this, note that RSL is measured as an annual rate and in percentage 
points. If  it were translated to  a  quarterly rate and measured as a fraction, the 
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Figure  2. Links  among  Housing,  Mortgage,  and  Deposit  Markets 
Interest  rates 
in capital  markets  Deposit flows  Interest  rate 
to thrift  Housing starts 
Interest  rate  institutions  on mortgages 
on thlrif  t deposits 
Plus 
Minus 
Figure 2 uses a flow diagram  to characterize  the same three-equation 
system.  Three  main  points  deserve  emphasis. 
First,  interest  rates  on securities,  RCAP,  affect  housing  starts  negatively 
through  two channels.  In one channel,  higher  values  of RCAP directly  in- 
crease  interest  rates  on mortgages;  in the other,  they  reduce  deposit  flows, 
which  then  raise  interest  rates  on mortgages.  These two channels  account 
for the strong  impact  of conditions  in security  markets  on housing  activity 
that  is confirmed  in most  studies. 
Second,  deposit  flows  to thrift  institutions,  ADEP,  affect  housing  starts 
through  two channels,  both with positive effects: by directly  enhancing 
credit  availability;  and  by operating  to reduce  interest  rates  on mortgages. 
Third, interest rates on thrift deposits, RSL, affect housing starts 
through  two channels,  but with offsetting  signs: in one channel,  higher 
values  of RSL increase  deposit  flows and hence stimulate  housing  starts; 
in the other channel, higher values of RSL increase interest rates on 
mortgages  (through  the cost markup  process), and the higher  mortgage 
interest  rates  then  depress  housing  activity.  Thus  factors  that  change  RSL, 
such  as changes  in Regulation  Q ceilings  (including  MMCs), have  a theo- 
retically  ambiguous  effect on activity  in the housing  market.  The effect 
of RSL on interest  rates  for mortgages  is also ambiguous  because  higher 
values  of RSL tend to raise  RM through  the cost markup  channel  and to 
lower  RM because  of larger  deposit  flows.  The simulation  results  reported 
below  provide  measures  of the relative  importance  of these various  chan- 
nels and of the net effect of MMCs on interest  rates for mortgages  and 
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Simulations  of the Individual  Equations 
The five structural  equations  of the model  were estimated  with sample 
periods  ending  in 1978:2, while in fact data are now available  through 
1979:2. This procedure  provides  an opportunity  for checking  the fit of 
the individual  equations  beyond  the sample  period  and then, in the next 
section,  for checking  the performance  of the full model. Single-equation 
dynamic  simulations  are used in this section;  each equation  is simulated 
by itself, taking other data as exogenous, but with dynamic  feedback 
through  any  lagged  dependent  variables. 
The results,  presented  in table 6, show the actual, simulated,  and re- 
sidual (actual minus  simulated) values for the five equations.  In evalu- 
ating  these results,  we looked for simulation  errors  that were especially 
large (relative  to the standard  error  of the estimated  equation) or that 
consistently  had the same sign. With the obvious  exception  of the equa- 
tion for deposit flows, the estimated  relationships  hold quite well. An 
overestimate  of single-family  housing  starts  by about 300,000 units (an- 
nual rate) in 1979:1 does stand out. But the extremely  cold and snowy 
winter  at that time was generally  perceived  by housing experts  to have 
reduced  actual  single-family  starts  by about  that amount.23 
In contrast,  deposit  flows  to thrift  institutions  are significantly  too low 
in the simulation,  with an accumulated  underestimate  of about $32 bil- 
lion over the four-quarter  period. Because MMCs were first issued in 
June  1978 and  had  a major  effect  during  the subsequent  year,  and  because 
the estimated  equation  has no special  features  accounting  for the certifi- 
cates,  it seems  plausible  that the residuals  in the simulation  are related  to 
the  MMCs.  Indeed,  on a closer  analysis,  which  we shall  now describe,  the 
pattern  of residuals  is remarkably  close to direct  measures  of the impact 
of the MMCs.  Actual  deposit  flows  to thrift  institutions  during  the period 
(as shown  in table 6) obviously  include  the net impact  of the certificates. 
We wish  to make  certain  adjustments  to the simulated  series  so that  it can 
be interpreted  as an estimate  of deposit  flows to thrift  institutions  in the 
23.  One might have expected these units to be made up in the spring quarter. 
However, the nature  of the sequential production process in housing and the capac- 
ity constraint  on the industry in the spring limit the feasibility of such a seasonal 
catch-up. See Kenneth T. Rosen, Seasonal Cycles in the Housing Market: Patterns, 
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Table  6. Single-Equation  Simulations  of Housing  and  Mortgage  Variables,  and 
Actual  Values,  1978:3-1979:2 
Itenm  1978:3  1978:4  1979:1  1979:2 
Change  in number  of owner-occuipied 
units  (thousands) 
Actual  323  317  333  346 
Simulated  350  345  333  324 
Residual  -27  -28  0  22 
Single-family  housing  starts 
(thousands,  at an annual  rate) 
Actual  1,426  1,471  1,204  1,247 
Simulated  1,430  1,494  1,507  1,280 
Residual  -4  -23  -303  -33 
Multifanmily  housing  starts 
(thousanzds,  at an annual  rate) 
Actual  606  579  494  557 
Simulated  648  583  544  478 
Residual  -42  -4  -50  79 
Interest  rate on mortgages 
(percentage  points) 
Actual  9.71  9.95  10.23  10.52 
Simulated  9.70  10.02  10.29  10.60 
Residual  0.01  -0.07  -0.06  -0.08 
Deposit  flows to thrift  institutions 
(billionis  of dollars) 
Actual  16.3  14.8  13.3  8.8 
Simulated  10.4  3.4  2.6  4.4 
Residual  5.9  11.4  10.7  4.4 
Sources: Simulated-derived  from text equations 2, 4, 5, 8, and 10, taking other data in each equation 
as exogenous, but allowing for dynamic feedback through any lagged dependent variables; actual-see 
appendix. The housing starts series are seasonally adjusted. 
absence  of the MMCs.  The resulting  residuals from the adjusted  simula- 
tion then  provide  an estimate  of the net impact  of the certificates  and can 
be compared  to available  direct measures  of their impact.  WVe  also de- 
velop a second  approach  in which  the simulated  series  is adjusted  so that 
it includes the impact  of the MMCs;  if that adjustment  is successful,  the 
resulting  simulation  should  closely  track  the actual  series. 
In the equation  for deposit flows to thrift  institutions  (10),  RSL in- 
cludes  the impact  of the certificates  on the average  interest  rate  on (total) 
deposits  of those  institutions  but by the same token excludes  most of the 364  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity,  2:1979 
impact  on the marginal yield made available  to depositors  by these cer- 
tificates.  For example,  at the point when MMCs were introduced,  they 
had no effect  on the average  rate,  but they provided  a much  higher  yield 
on the margin  to potential  savers.  Thus the interest differential term in 
the equation,  (RTB  -  RSL),  clearly  would underestimate  the impact  of 
MMCs  by including  their  effect  on the average,  rather  than the marginal, 
interest  rate.  On the other  hand,  no problem  arises  in the interest-credited 
term of the equation  because  the average  deposit  rate  is the relevant  con- 
cept  for that  effect. 
SIMULATION  EXCLUDING  MONEY-MARKET  CERTIFICATES 
For the first  approach,  we want to purge  both the interest-differential 
and  the  interest-credited  terms  of any  impact  of the  MMCs;  for the second 
approach,  we wish  to do the opposite,  that  is, to include  the impact  of the 
MMCs  correctly  in both terms.  Implementing  the first  approach,  we cal- 
culate  an adjusted  series  for  RSL, called  RSLX, that  is intended  to remove 
the influence  of the MMCs on the average deposit rate for the period 
1978:3 to 1979:2. We then substitute  RSLX for RSL in both terms of 
equation  10 and calculate simulated  values that estimate  what deposit 
flows  of thrift  institutions  would  have been in the absence  of MMCs.  The 
values  for RSLX are determined  by estimating  an equation  for RSL for 
the  period  from  1966: 1 to 1978:2, and  then  simulating  the values  through 
1979 :2. Because  the period  ending  in 1978:2 does not include  the effects 
of MMCs,  the simulated  values  should  also be free of any influences  from 
these  certificates. 
For this  purpose,  the following  equation  links RSL to the Treasury  bill 
rate,  RTB;  to Regulation  Q ceiling  rates  on passbook  deposits,  RPB, and 
on previously  authorized  certificates,  RCT; and to its own lagged value 
for  the  period  from  1966: 1 to 1978:2, as follows: 
(11) RSL =  constant +  0.07RCT  +  O.01(RTB -  RPB) +  0.9ORSL.1, 
(3.0)  (2.8)  (27.7) 
RI  =  0.999; Durbin-Watson  =  2.03; standard  error =  0.02; rho =  0.40. 
The interest rates on Treasury bills and on passbook deposits are entered 
as a differential to indicate that changes in these two interest rates influ- 
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Table  7. Effective  Interest  Rate and  Deposit  Flows to Thrift  Institutions,  Actual  and 
Simulated  in the Absence  of Money-Market  Certificates,  1978:3-1979:2 
Item  1978:3  1978:4  1979:1  1979:2 
Effective  interest  rate on deposits  to thrift 
institutions  (percentage  points) 
Actual  6.65  6.75  7.05  7.25 
Simulated  6.61  6.66  6.71  6.75 
Residual  0.04  0.09  0.34  0.50 
Deposit  flows to thrift  institutions 
(billionis  of dollars) 
Actual  16.3  14.8  13.3  8.8 
Simulated  10.2  2.9  0.7  1.6 
Residual  6.1  11.9  12.6  7.2 
Addendum:  Actual net change  in money- 
market  certificates  25.4a  30.2  38.9  15.4 
Sources: Simulated-derived  from text equations 10 and 11 as described in the text; actual-see  appen- 
dix. Data on money-market  certificates are from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
a.  This figure includes data for June 1978. 
shift the mix of funds toward  certificate  accounts.  The lagged dependent 
variable  indicates  a speed of adjustment  of 10 percent  a quarter  in these 
processes.  The equation  fits the data  well;  its simulated  values  for 1978:3 
to 1979:2 are shown in table 7. As expected,  these simulated  values lie 
below the actual effective  deposit rate because the equation makes no 
allowances  for MMCs. Indeed, it is for this reason that the simulated 
values  can be inserted  as RSLX into equation  10 to generate  estimates  of 
deposit  flows  to thrift  institutions  in the absence  of MMCs;  those results 
also appear  in table 7. In the table we interpret  the simulated  deposit 
flows as a hypothetical  estimate  of how deposits  would have behaved  in 
the absence  of MMCs.  Because  the deposit  flows  obviously  reflect  the full 
impact  of MMCs,  the residuals  represent  an estimate  of the net impact  of 
MMCs.  The accumulated  sum of residuals  is about $38 billion for the 
four-quarter  period, and this sum can now be compared  with the avail- 
able data  on actual  MMC  flows. 
The actual  data  indicate  that  the volume  of MMCs  at thrift  institutions 
rose to a net amount  of $109.9 billion  by the middle  of 1979. Clearly,  the 
net effect  of MMCs  on the total deposits  of thrift  institutions  was substan- 
tially smaller  than the $110 billion figure  to the extent that MMCs ab- 
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the absence  of available  data, that more than half of the net change in 
MMCs  for savings  and loan associations  and nearly  all the net change  at 
mutual  savings  banks  were simply  transfers  from other accounts  at thrift 
institutions.  Thus  a comparison  of the $38 billion  estimate  in table  7 with 
the actual  net flow of $110 billion implies  that, in the aggregate,  about 
two-thirds  of funds  flowing  into  MMCs  at thrift  institutions  were  attracted 
from  other  thrift  accounts.  This appears  fully consistent  with  the available 
estimate. 
Moreover,  the time  pattern  of the residual  estimates  of table 7 is con- 
sistent  with actual  experience.  Beginning  with the introduction  of MMCs 
in June  1978, their  growth  accelerated  through  1978 as interest  rates  rose 
and as more  institutions  offered  the certificates;  growth  then leveled off 
during  1979:1, as did short-term  interest  rates.  Finally,  growth  declined 
in 1979:2, in part  reflecting  additional  regulations  that were imposed  on 
the MMCs  in March 1979, which reduced  their attractiveness  to some 
extent.24  The data for deposit  flows to thrift  institutions  in table 7 show 
this pattern  clearly.  The simulated  series,  which we interpret  as the way 
deposit  flows  would have performed  in the absence  of MMCs, declined 
sharply  during  1978:4 and 1979: 1 under  the pressure  of high short-term 
rates  and then recovered  slightly in 1979:2 as these conditions  tempo- 
rarily  eased.  The residual  series, which  we interpret  as the net contribu- 
tion of MMCs, rose during 1978:3 and 1978:4, leveled off in 1979:1, 
and  then  declined  quite  sharply  in 1979:2. 
SIMULATIONS  INCORPORATING  MMCS 
The second  approach  for evaluating  the implications  of MMCs  adjusts 
the RSL  series  as it enters  equation  10 to include  the effects  of the certifi- 
cates  on marginal  (as well as average) deposit  rates.  As noted above,  the 
historical  values of RSL are correct for this purpose in the interest- 
credited  term  of 10, but not in the interest differential term. Indeed,  the 
key feature  of the  MMCs  was that  they  provided  depositors  with  marginal 
yields several percentage  points higher than the average contained in 
RSL. The obvious  series to use for this marginal  yield from 1978:3 to 
1979:1 is the six-month  Treasury  bill rate itself because  it was the basis 
24. Specifically,  the new regulations  eliminated  the compounding  of returns  within 
the six-month maturity and the differential of  0.25 percent in favor of  the thrift 
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Table  8. Deposit  Flows  to Thrift  Institutions,  Actual  and  Simulated  Incorporating 
Money-Market  Certificates,  1978:3-1979:2 
Billions of dollars 
Item  1978:3  1978:4  1979:1  1979:2 
ActuLal  16.3  14.8  13.3  8.8 
Simulated  13.9  13.6  13.9  10.9 
Residual  2.4  1.2  -0.6  -2.1 
Sources: Simulated-derived  from text equation 10 as described in table 6, with the effective interest 
rate on deposit flows of thrift institutions replaced by the six-month Treasury bill rate for  1978:3-1979:1 
and by that rate minus 75 basis points for 1979:2 in the equation's interest differential term; actual-see 
appendix. 
for calculating  the ceiling rate on MMCs during  this period.25  During 
1979:2, on the other  hand,  inflows  reflected  the regulatory  changes  made 
in March  that lowered the ceiling rate effectively  below the six-month 
Treasury  bill rate.  A reasonable  estimate  is that the restrictions  lowered 
the ceiling  by about  75 basis  points  relative  to the six-month  Treasury  bill 
rate. Setting RTB6X equal to the six-month  Treasury  bill rate from 
1978:3 to 1979:1 and below that rate by 75 basis points in 1979:2, we 
carried  out an additional  extrapolation  with RTB6X  replacing  RSL in 
the interest-differential  term of the deposit-flow  equation.  The results  of 
that  extrapolation  are shown  in table 8. The fit is now quite  good, and it 
is evident  that replacing  RSL with RTB6X  in the deposit-flow  equation 
eliminates  the systematic  underestimate  of the deposit flow shown in 
table  6. 
Simulation  Results  for the Full Model 
The econometric  model  of the housing,  mortgage,  and deposit  markets 
described  here  combines  the five estimated  equations  with  three  equations 
for housing  and rent  prices  and four accounting  identities  that determine 
the outstanding  stock and the vacancy rate for the two types of struc- 
tures.26  The model is dynamically  simulated,  first  to quantify  the impact 
25. We feel confident in ignoring the minor but complex adjustments  to the rate 
on six-month  Treasury  bills that would be required  to measure exactly the yield paid 
by the thrift  institutions  on the MMCs. 
26. The three pricing equations cover single-family house prices, PH; the rental 
component  of the consumer  price index, CPIR; and the home ownership component 
of the consumer  price index, CPIO. These equations are of limited interest  by them- 
selves, and primarily  serve to close the model. They are available from the authors  on 
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of the MMCs  on activity  in the housing  and mortgage  markets,  and then 
to identify  the channels  through  which such effects  operate.  The simula- 
tions are carried  out for four quarters  beyond the end of the estimation 
period,  1978:3 to 1979:2-which,  except  for the June 1978 observation, 
coincides  with  the available  data  for  the  MMC  period. 
SIMULATION  WITH  MONEY-MARKET  CERTIFICATES 
The first  experiment  is essentially  a historical  simulation  of the housing 
and  mortgage  sectors  during  the 1978:3 to 1979:2 period,  and includes 
the impact  of the MMCs.  A key property  of the simulation  relates  to the 
treatment  of the deposit  flows to thrift  institutions.  Because  the equation 
for deposit flows has only exogenous variables  among its independent 
variables,  there  is no loss in making  these flows  themselves  exogenous  for 
the purposes  of this simulation,  and we follow this course.  This guaran- 
tees, of course,  that the impact  of the MMCs  on deposit  flows  is fully in- 
corporated  in the results.  Alternatively,  the equation  for deposit flows, 
with the adjusted  six-month  Treasury  bill rate, RTB6X, serving  as the 
marginal  deposit  rate, tracks  the actual flows closely, and thus provides 
similar  results. 
Table  9 shows  the actual,  simulated,  and  residual  values  of this simula- 
tion. In view of the close fits reported  for the single-equation  simulations 
discussed  above,  it is not surprising  that  the model  tracks  well even allow- 
ing  for dynamic  interaction  of the equations.  The largest  error  in the simu- 
lation-for  housing  starts  in 1979 :1-has  been explained  above. 
SIMULATION  WITHOUT  MONEY-MARKET  CERTIFICATES 
A second  simulation  was carried  out to provide  quantitative  estimates 
of how the deposit,  mortgage,  and  housing  sectors  would  have performed 
in the absence  of MMCs.  The principal  change  from the previous  simu- 
lation  is that  the deposit  flows to thrift  institutions  are now treated  as an 
endogenous  element of the model. Moreover,  the average  effective in- 
terest  rate  paid  on these deposits,  RSL, is replaced  with  RSLX, following 
the discussion  and results  of table 7 above. The simulated  values of the 
deposit-flow  equation  then correspond  to an environment  without  MMCs. 
The results  of the simulation  without  MMCs  are shown  in table 10 as 
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Table  9. Multiequation  Simulation  of Housing  and  Mortgage  Variables,  and 
Actual  Values,  1978:3-1979:2 
Item  1978:3  1978:4  1979:1  1979:2 
Chlange  in the number  of owner- 
occupied  units  (thousands) 
Actual  323  317  333  346 
Simulated  350  344  339  329 
Residual  -27  -27  -6  17 
Single-family  housing  starts 
(thousands,  at an annual  rate) 
Actual  1,426  1,471  1,204  1,247 
Simulated  1,440  1,504  1,519  1,281 
Residual  -14  -33  -315  -34 
Multifamily  housing  starts 
(thousands,  at an annual  rate) 
Actual  606  579  494  557 
Simulated  638  582  543  493 
Residual  -32  -3  -49  64 
Interest  rate on mortgages 
(percentage  points) 
Actual  9.71  9.95  10.23  10.52 
Simulated  9.70  10.01  10.29  10.63 
Residual  0.01  -0.06  -0.06  -0.11 
Deposit  flows to thrift  institutions 
(billions  of dollars)" 
Actual  16.3  14.8  13.3  8.8 
Sources: Simulated-derived  from text equations 2, 4, 5, and 8 and from three equations for housing 
and rent prices and four accounting identities not presented in the text, as described in table 6; actual- 
see appendix. The housing starts series are seasonally adjusted. 
a.  This variable is treated as exogenous in the simulation, thus guaranteeing that the impact of money- 
market certificates  is fully incorporated in the results. 
can thus be interpreted  as the effects of introducing  MMCs during  the 
period,  as estimated  by the model. The results  indicate  a strong,  positive 
impact  of the  MMCs  on housing  activity. 
Specifically,  deposit  flows show an accumulated  net addition  of $37.8 
billion  over  the four-quarter  period  resulting  from  the introduction  of the 
MMCs.  These  results  in table 10 for deposit  flows are identical  to the re- 
sults previously  shown as the residuals  for the deposit-flow  equation  in 
table 7. This occurs because the determinants  of deposit flows in the 
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Table  10. Net Effect  of Money-Market  Certificates  on Housing  and  Mortgage 
Variables,  1978:3-1979:2 
Item  1978:3  1978:4  1979:1  1979:2  Total 
Change  in the number  of owner- 
occupied  units (thousands)  0  16  23  12  52 
Single-family  housing  starts 
(thousands,  at an annual  rate)  27  111  233  147  122 
Multifamily  housing  starts 
(thousands,  at an annual  rate)  59  178  301  171  169 
Interest  rate on mortgages 
(percentage  points)  0.00  -0.02  -0.09  -0.08  -0.08 
Deposit flows to thrift institu- 
tions (billions  of dollars)  6.1  11.9  12.6  7.2  37.8 
Source: Calculated as the difference between the results of thie  simulation incorporating money-market 
certificates  presented in table 9 and a  simulation excluding them, as described in the text.  Figures are 
rounded. 
Interest  rates  on mortgages  show little net effect  from  the introduction 
of the MMCs.  The change  by 1979:2 is a decrement  of 8 basis points, 
with  the maximum  effect  during  the period  a decrement  of 9 basis  points 
in 1979 :1. As discussed  above,  the net effect  on the interest  rate  of mort- 
gages  is the result  of two offsetting  forces: downward  pressure  created  by 
augmented  deposit  flows  and upward  pressure  created  by increased  costs 
of funds  for thrift  institutions.  In fact,  each  of these  effects  taken  alone  has 
an impact  of about 25 basis points during  the 1978:3 to 1979:2 period, 
with  the deposit  flow dominating  by a modest  margin. 
Housing  starts  are distinctly  and  positively  affected  by the MMCs.  For 
the four-quarter  period,  total starts  are 291,000 units higher  in the pres- 
ence of the MMCs,  with about 40 percent  of the effect on single-family 
units  and  about  60 percent  on multifamily  units.  The primary  channel  for 
this effect  is the augmented  deposit  flow, although  the small  decrement  in 
the mortgage  rate reinforces  it slightly.  The larger effect of MMCs on 
multifamily  units is reasonable  in view of the historical  relationship  that 
indicates  a greater  cyclical  sensitivity  of multifamily  than of single-family 
starts.  Thus,  to the extent  that the MMCs  have offset one factor  creating 
this cyclical  sensitivity,  the greater  support  for multifamily  housing  starts 
is not surprising. 
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cyclical  declines  in housing  starts  that  can be attributed  to reduced  avail- 
ability  of credit.  They  imply  that,  in the absence  of MMCs,  housing  starts 
in 1979:2 would  have occurred  at an annual  rate just under 1.5 million 
units,  a decline  of about  500,000 from  the 2.0 million  pace of 1978. Thus 
our estimate  of an increment  of about 300,000 units, both for the four 
quarters  combined  and  for the annual  rate  of 1979 :2, indicates  that  more 
than  half of the potential  decline  was avoided  through  the introduction  of 
the  MMCs  in June  1978. 
In line with the housing  starts,  our results  indicate  that the number  of 
owner-occupied  units was higher  by about 52,000 during  the 1978:3 to 
1979:2 period  because  of the presence  of MMCs.  That is less than the 
122,000 increment  in single-family  housing starts,  indicating  that deci- 
sions on tenure  choice are less sensitive  to credit availability  than deci- 
sions on housing starts. An interesting  implication  is that the MMCs 
slowed the actual decline in vacancy rates by augmenting  the stock of 
available  units  more  than the stock demand  for these units. 
SIMULATION  OF  THE  IMPACT  OF  FEDERAL  AGENCIES 
In a final  simulation,  we explore  the impact  during  1978-79 of the fed- 
eral  agencies  that  supply  credit  to the mortgage  market.  In this model,  the 
activity  of these agencies  was summarized  in the variable  FAC, which  in- 
cludes  the new mortgage  commitments  of GNMA, FNMA, and  FHLMC, 
and the net change  in advance  loans of the FHLBB. The variable  FAC 
enters  the  model  in the equations  explaining  the mortgage  rate  and single- 
family  housing  starts.  Higher  values  for FAC reduce  the interest  rate on 
mortgages  and  stimulate  single-family  housing  starts. 
The activity  of these agencies  in the 1978-79 period was somewhat 
unusual.  The quarterly  values  of FAC from 1977:1 to 1979:2 are as fol- 
lows. 
First  Second  Third  Fourth 
quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter 
1977  2.9  6.3  5.6  7.7 
1978  8.2  13.2  9.7  9.3 
1979  2.3  8.1  ... 
The year 1977 could  be characterized  as a relatively  standard  year  for the 
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tinctly  below them when measured  relative  to housing  prices. The low 
value  in 1977:  1 also reflects  a characteristic,  seasonal  pattern.  The year 
1978, in contrast,  shows record high values in nominal terms in every 
quarter,  and in real terms  in the first and fourth quarters.  The data for 
1979:1 and 1979:2 then show a return  to more  typical  levels. The activi- 
ties of the federal  agencies  during  1978 have been criticized  for stimu- 
lating  an already  strong  housing  market,  especially  in a period of accel- 
erating  inflation. 
With  this  background,  we carried  out a simulation  in which  the values 
for FAC during 1978 were replaced  with the corresponding  quarterly 
values  that  occurred  during  the more  typical  year  of 1977. The simulation 
was carried  out with MMCs  in the model (see table 9)  and the results, 
shown as deviations  from the base with MMCs in the model are as 
follows.27 
1978:3  1978:4  1979:1  1979:2  Total 
Interest  rate  on 
mortgages  (percentage 
points)  -0.03  -0.05  -0.06  -0.04  ... 
Single-family  housing 
starts  (thousands, 
at  an  annual  rate)  39  38  22  6  23 
The values  indicate  relatively  modest  effects  from  the high, actual  fed- 
eral agency  activity.  Interest  rates on mortgages  are lower, as expected, 
when  the activity  of the agencies  is included  in the market,  but the maxi- 
mum impact  was only 6 basis points in 1979:1. Single-family  housing 
starts  are  higher,  because  of the increase  in agency  activity  and  the decline 
in interest  rates  on mortgages,  with a four-quarter  cumulative  increase  of 
23,000 units. The impact  on housing  starts  was centered  in the last two 
quarters  of 1978, with  a simulated  increase  close to 40,000 units  at annual 
rates  in both quarters.  Thus,  while  the results  confirm  that  federal  agency 
policy stimulated  housing activity during 1978-79  (perhaps unfortu- 
nately), the number  of housing  units is not large, especially  when com- 
pared  with the impact  of the MMCs. 
27. These results are generated by replacing values for FAC during 1978 with 
actual 1977 values, and are derived from the simulation results of table 9 minus the 
simulation  results  with the (lower)  1977 actual values of FAC. The data for housing 
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Conclusions 
The paper has developed, estimated,  and simulated  a five-equation 
model  of the deposit,  mortgage,  and  housing  sectors  of the U.S. economy. 
The theoretical  structure  emphasized  the following  points: 
Stock-level,  housing-demand  schedules  incorporate  demographic,  rela- 
tive price,  and mortgage  availability  factors. 
Flow-level,  housing-supply  schedules determine  multifamily  housing 
starts  as a function  of profit  incentives  for the construction  industry. 
Flow-level,  housing-demand  schedules  determine  single-family  hous- 
ing starts  as a stock adjustment  response  to stock-level  housing  demand. 
Deposit  flows  to thrift  institutions  allow  for new saving  allocations  and 
existing  deposit  reallocation  as a function  of available  funds and interest 
rate  differentials. 
Interest  rates on mortgages  are determined  by a process of disequi- 
librium  adjustment  with exogenous  demand  and supply  factors. 
Estimation  and single-equation  simulation  results  were consistent  with 
the theory  and  provided  close fits in all cases. The one serious  indication 
of simulation  error  was evident  in the equation  for deposit  flows  to thrift 
institutions,  where  the existence  of MMCs  had  to be taken  into account  to 
fit the actual  data.  In fact, however,  when  the six-month  Treasury  bill rate 
was used as the marginal  interest  rate for household depositors,  the fit 
became  remarkably  close. 
The simulation  experiments  focused  on the reasons  for the unexpected 
strength  in housing  construction  during  the last half of 1978 and the first 
half of 1979. The results  indicate  that the introduction  of the MMCs  in 
June 1978 is the principal  factor responsible  for the strong  showing  by 
housing.  The MMCs at thrift  institutions  grew  by about $110 billion by 
the middle  of 1979; about one-third  ($38 billion) of that total is esti- 
mated  to represent  net "new money."  Simulation  experiments  indicated 
that housing  starts during  the interval  from 1978 :3 to 1979:2  would 
have been almost  300,000 units  lower in the absence  of the MMCs.  The 
simulation  results  showed  also that the MMCs  augmented  housing  starts 
mainly  by increasing  the availability  of mortgage  credit,  with  only a small 
effect  from  lower  interest  rates  on mortgages. 
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high  during  1978, but the simulation  results  indicate  a more  modest  effect 
on housing  starts,  about 23,000 units from this source between 1978:3 
and 1979:2. The demand  for housing  as an investment  asset  also appears 
to have  contributed  little  to the number  of housing  starts  during  the 1978- 
79 period. Our data indicate  that the widely publicized  "surge  toward 
home ownership"  is exaggerated,  and the part that does exist affects  the 
demand  for existing  homes (and existing  home prices) much more than 
the  number  of new  housing  starts. 
Considering  the near-term  prospects  for housing  activity,  we find  that 
cyclical  fluctuations  in home building  continue  to be determined  largely 
by the pattern  of deposit  flows to thrift  institutions.  For example,  those 
deposit  flows  may decline sharply  under  the pressure  of high short-term 
interest  rates  on securities  if MMCs  fail to augment  inflows  strongly  be- 
cause  of regulatory  limitations  placed  on the certificates  or because  thrift 
institutions  do not offer the allowed ceiling rate. In that event, a more 
traditional,  sharper  cyclical  decline  in housing  starts  may develop  during 
late 1979 and  early  1980. 
APPENDIX 
Variables  and Data Sources 
TEIE  FOLLOWING  variables appear in the text. 
CPIO  =  home ownership  component  of the consumer  price 
index (1967  =  100),  quarterly  averages  of  data 
(not seasonally  adjusted)  from  the Bureau  of Labor 
Statistics. 
CPIR = rent  component  of the  consumer  price  index  (1967= 
100), quarterly  averages  of data (not seasonally  ad- 
justed) from the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics. 
CPIT  =  consumer  price index, all items for all urban con- 
sumers (1967  =  100),  quarterly  averages  of data 
(not seasonally  adjusted)  from  the Bureau  of Labor 
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DEP = outstanding  deposits  of savings  and  loan associations 
and  mutual  savings  banks (billions  of dollars), end- 
of-quarter  data (not seasonally  adjusted)  from the 
Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System. 
FAC = sum of new mortgage  commitments  issued by the 
Government  National Mortgage  Association, Fed- 
eral National Mortgage  Association, and Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,  and the net 
change  in Federal  Home Loan Bank advances  (bil- 
lions of dollars), quarterly  rates (not seasonally  ad- 
justed),  from Federal Reserve Bulletin, various is- 
sues, and from the Govermment  National  Mortgage 
Association. 
HADJ = number  of owner-occupied  housing  units, adjusted 
for 1970 owner-occupancy  rates (thousands). See 
the text for construction  technique. 
HOWN  = number of  owner-occupied  housing units (thou- 
sands), calculated as the product of  the owner- 
occupancy  rate  and  the number  of households,  from 
Bureau  of  the  Census,  Housing  Vacancy  Survey, 
various issues; and Current  Population Survey, P-20, 
Population  Characteristics, and  P-25,  Population 
Estimates and Projections, various issues. 
KSF  and  KMF  outstanding  stock  of single-  and  multifamily  housing 
units, respectively (thousands), constructed  using 
perpetual  inventory  technique  with constant  depre- 
ciation rates fitted for data from Bureau of  the 
Census,  Census  of  Population,  1970  and Annual 
Housing Survey, 1974-76. 
PH =  index of housing  prices  for new homes, adjusted  for 
1974 house characteristics  (hundred  thousand  dol- 
lars, not seasonally  adjusted), from Bureau  of the 
Census, Construction Reports, C27, Price Index of 
New One-Family Houses Sold, various issues. 
SAV = personal  saving (billions of dollars, seasonally  ad- 
justed at annual  rates), from Bureau  of Economic 
Analysis,  national  income and product  accounts. 
SSF and SMF = single- and multifamily  housing starts,  respectively 376  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1979 
(thousands), quarterly  data (not  seasonally ad- 
justed),  from  the Bureau  of the Census. 
RAAA =  Moody's  Aaa corporate  bond rate (percent), quar- 
terly averages from Federal Reserve Bulletin, various 
issues. 
RM = mortgage  interest  rate,  savings  and  loan associations 
(percent), quarterly  averages  from Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board Journal, various issues. 
RSL =  effective  deposit  rate  of savings  and  loan associations 
(percent), interpolated  from semiannual  data from 
Federal Home  Loan Bank Board Journal, various 
issues. 
RTB = three-month  Treasury  bill rate for new issues, bank 
discount basis (percent), quarterly  averages  from 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues. 
RTB6 = six-month  Treasury  bill rate for new issues, bank 
discount basis (percent), quarterly  averages  from 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues. 
R3-5 =  rate on three- to five-year  government  bonds (per- 
cent), quarterly  averages  from  Federal  Reserve  Bul- 
letin, various  issues. 
UR = unemployment  rate, all civilian  workers (percent), 
quarterly  averages  from the Bureau of Labor Sta- 
tistics. 
VO and VR = vacancy  rate,  units  for sale, and vacancy  rate,  rental 
units, respectively (percent) from Bureau of the 
Census, Housing Vacancy Survey, various issues. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Benjamin  M. Friedman:  Dwight Jaffee and Kenneth  Rosen have writ- 
ten a useful and stimulating  paper  that  highlights  in particular  the impor- 
tance of the new money-market  certificates  among  recent developments 
in the financing  of residential  construction  in the United States. Their 
paper  also addresses  a number  of other  questions,  about  how the economy 
works and about  what  policy  should  be, which  it resolves  less clearly.  My 
comments  will focus  primarily  on some of those open questions. 
The paper  by Jaffee  and Rosen treats  a subject  that  is important  for at 
least two reasons.  One  is that  interesting  questions  persist  in the economics 
of housing  supply  and  demand  per se. Among the more significant  issues 
here is that of the relative  importance,  in the determination  of housing 
demand, of demographic  or sociological factors versus variables  more 
familiar  to economists.  Moreover,  even within  the category  of standard 
economic  variables,  there  is the issue  of those  that  represent  service  prices 
versus  those that  reflect  asset  yields. One part  of my comments  will focus 
on the authors'  emphasis  on service-price  variables  over asset-yield  vari- 
ables. 
A second  reason  why  the subject  of this paper  is important  sterns  from 
the role that residential  construction  plays in determining  overall U.S. 
macroeconomic  activity.  A quick  calculation  based  on the authors'  results 
will readily  highlight  how significant  housing  can be in this context.  Jaffee 
and Rosen conclude  that, over the one-year  period  ending  last June, the 
introduction  of money-market  certificates  made a difference  of approxi- 
mately 300,000 housing  starts.  If the average  house price  is $60,000 and 
the consumption  multiplier  is 2.0, this one new development  alone added 
more than 1.5 percent  to the U.S. GNP during  that one-year  period (be- 
fore allowance  for whatever  "crowding  out" effects  would  have occurred 
377 378  Brookings  Papers  on Economic Activity,  2:1979 
within  the year). The absence  of that 1.5 percent  from the GNP between 
mid-year  1978 and  mid-year  L979 would  have  made  a major  difference  for 
a number  of issues currently  receiving  widespread  attention-for  exam- 
ple, whether  or not the economy  is now, or recently  has been, in a reces- 
sion. In a more general context, Jaffee and Rosen provide evidence 
showing  that, because  of the introduction  of money-market  certificates, 
the way in which  monetary  policy affects  nonfinancial  economic  activity 
in the United  States  is likely  to be different  in the  future.  To the extent  that 
monetary  policy has been an important  factor in determining  the U.S. 
economy's  cyclical  behavior,  therefore,  the  pattern  of U.S. business  cycles 
is likely  to change  as well. 
After  reviewing  the various  issues  that  motivate  their  paper,  the authors 
develop  a model of housing,  mortgages,  interest  rates  on mortgages,  and 
deposits,  and then apply this model to simulate  the effects  of two kinds 
of policies:  the introduction  of money-market  certificates,  and  the support 
of  the mortgage  market by federally sponsored credit agencies and 
mortgage  pools. My substantive  comments  on the paper  focus primarily 
on the construction  of the model. In addition,  I offer a few comments  on 
the  second  set  of policy  simulations. 
Three  aspects  of the model are  of interest.  The first  is the determination 
of the interest  rate  on mortgages.  Jaffee  and  Rosen have highlighted  what 
they properly  consider  to be a novel feature  of the model-in  particular, 
the "markup"  element according  to which the interest rate that thrift 
institutions  pay on their deposits  has a positive carry-over  effect on the 
interest  rate that they charge on their mortgage  loans. Although some 
economists  would object to this proposition  as a description  of either 
short-run  or long-run  behavior  by thrift  institutions,  on the ground  that 
higher  deposit  rates increase  the supply  of funds available  for mortgage 
lending,  I would  not necessarily  reject  it in the short-run  context  in which 
profit  pressures  could  well affect  some  aspect  of the adjustment  process  of 
the institutions.  The problem,  however,  is that  the equation  developed  by 
Jaffee  and  Rosen does not distinguish  between  the short  run and the long 
run. In their equation,  the rate of interest  paid by thrift  institutions  on 
their own deposits  carries  over in a markup  fashion to interest  rates on 
mortgages  even in the long run. This latter proposition  is much more 
difficult  to accept. 
It is probably  useful to distinguish,  therefore,  between  short-run  and 
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tion  for the mortgage  interest  rate.  One  way  to do so would  be to reformu- 
late the model by  putting the markup component into  an  explicit 
adjustment  variable,  so that  the speed  of adjustment  of the mortgage  rate 
depends  in part on the currently  prevailing  relationship  between the 
mortgage  rate and the deposit  rate.  The specification  here  must  be some- 
what complicated  in order  to have the adjustment  speed vary always  in 
the right way-depending  positively on  the  deposit rate when the 
mortgage  rate is adjusting  upward,  but negatively  if the mortgage  rate is 
adjusting  downward.  A  simple specification,  in which the adjustment 
speed  depends  positively  on the deposit  rate  regardless  of the direction  of 
adjustment,  will not be adequate.  The best approach  under  the circum- 
stances  is probably  a formulation  analogous  to that  which  Arthur  Tread- 
way  suggested  for fixed  investment. 
A second  component  of the model that warrants  close scrutiny  is the 
determination  of the quantity  of thrift  deposits.  Here the problem  is that 
the model  never directly  faces the question  of what the plausible  substi- 
tutes  are  for  thrift  deposits  in people's  portfolios.  Although  the description 
in the paper represents  the demand  for thrift deposits as a function of 
some  generalized  vector  of yields  on other  assets,  it turns  out that  the only 
such yield that in fact enters the relevant  equation  is the Treasury  bill 
rate. It is probably  reasonable  to think of that rate as a proxy for the 
competing  yields  not only on Treasury  bills  but also on commercial  paper, 
some Treasury  securities  with longer  maturities,  shares  of money-market 
funds,  and other  short-term  open market  paper  that is, or could be, held 
by the households  who hold the majority  of the thrift  deposits.  Even so, 
this  list does  not adequately  represent  the range  of plausible  substitutes  for 
deposits  at thrift  institutions. 
As of the end of 1978, households  held thrift  deposits  worth  $625 bil- 
lion. By contrast,  households'  total ownership  of all assets  for which the 
Treasury  bill rate (even broadly  interpreted,  as above) might  serve as a 
yield proxy  was only $170 billion. What, then, were the other princinal 
financial  assets of households?  Their other holdings at the end of 1978 
included money (M,),  $222 billion; savings deposits in commercial 
banks,  $472 billion;  and stocks and bonds, $1,055 billion. Hence by in- 
cluding  the  Treasury  bill rate  as the only  competing  asset  yield in the equa- 
tion, Jaffee  and Rosen implicitly  assume  that this large amount  of thrift 
institution  deposits  is a substitute  for only a narrow  slice of the household 
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in which  thrift  deposits  are assumed  to be substitutable  only within  the 
limited  class  of liquid  assets,  one would  expect  that  they  would  at least  be 
substitutes  for bank  deposits.  Indeed,  Peter  Fortune  found  that  to be true 
empirically;  and  Richard  Kopcke,  using  a more  general  formulation,  also 
found evidence  for substitutability  between thrift deposits and savings 
deposits  at commercial  banks. 
In addition  to the issue of what competing  asset  yields to include,  the 
authors'  deposit-demand  equation  raises further  questions  like whether 
the  equation  should  include  wealth  effects,  income  effects,  or lagged  stocks 
of other assets. Most economists  would be quite startled,  for example, 
if there  were not an income  variable  in a money (M,)  demand  function. 
If the familiar  transactions  motive leads people to demand  more money 
as their  incomes  rise,  however,  it also has to lead them  to demand  less of 
at least  some other  asset.  What  should  that other  asset  be?  Noncheckable 
thrift  deposits  are a plausible  candidate,  and hence the demand  for thrift 
deposits  could well include a (negative) income effect.  More generally, 
there is ample room on the agenda for future research  to focus more 
sharply  on the demand  for thrift  deposits. 
The third  part  of the model on which  I will comment  is the determina- 
tion of housing  demand.  It is at this point that Jaffee  and Rosen's  treat- 
ment of economic variables focuses almost exclusively on those that 
represent  the price  of housing  services  as opposed  to those that represent 
the return  on housing  as an asset.  Rosen's  previous  work,  as well as recent 
work by Patric Hendershott,  has shown that the asset return  to home 
ownership  has varied  substantially  during  the past few years. (This vari- 
ation  has come  largely  from  inflation,  and  it has been importantly  affected 
by the advantages  of unrealized  capital  gains and the tax deductibility  of 
mortgage  interest and other house-related  expenses.) This asset-yield 
element  of the determination  of the demand  for housing  is not nearly  so 
well captured  in the Jaffee-Rosen  model as is the service-price  element  in 
the sense  of the price  of housing  services  relative  to the general  price  level, 
or the  price  of owner-occupied  housing  relative  to rental  housing. 
Finally, I turn to the simulations.  Here my concern is not with the 
simulations  of the effects  of money-market  certificates,  which seem quite 
plausible  to me, but instead  with the simulations  of the effect of federal 
support  for  the  mortgage  market.  The authors'  main  finding  on this  subject 
is that, in contrast  to money-market  certificates,  federal  support  for the 
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expected  recent strength  of home-building  activity  in the United States. 
This conclusion is somewhat  surprising  because the year 1978 was a 
record  high  for this kind  of federal  support.  The sponsored  credit  agencies 
and mortgage  pools together  provided  a record $43 billion in mortgage 
credit  in 1978, more  than  a quarter  of the $149 billion  of mortgage  credit 
extended overall. In the single-family  home-mortgage  market,  agencies 
and mortgage  pools provided  a record  $37 billion,  more  than  one-third  of 
the $106 billion  market  total.  This  rapid  pace continued  into the first  half 
of 1979. 
Part of the problem  stems  from the authors'  use of the year 1977 as 
the base for comparison.  Federal  support  for the mortgage  market  in that 
year, which Jaffee and Rosen treat as normal, in fact came to a then- 
record $28 billion, mainly  because of the surge in activity  in mortgage 
pools. Moreover,  the state  of the economy  in 1977 and 1978, in terms  of 
both overall cyclical  posture  and the level of interest  rates in the open 
market,  was hardly  comparable  to that  in 1974, the previous  record  year. 
The main  problem,  however,  is that  the Jaffee-Rosen  model  focuses  on the 
sponsored  agencies  and largely  ignores  the mortgage  pools, which over 
time have been accounting  for a greater  share  of the total federal  support 
($18 billion  of the $43 billion  total in 1978). On balance,  therefore,  the 
role of federal  support  in generating  the record  volume  of U.S. mortgage 
credit  extensions  in 1978 remains,  at the least, an open  question.  Whether 
that amount  of support,  together  with the resulting  volume of mortgage 
credit, was a positive  or a negative  development  remains  a useful topic 
for further  discussion  and research,  despite  the implication  of the paper 
that  it did  not matter  much. 
Lawrence  R. Klein: This is an interesting  paper with important  esti- 
mates, and it is skillfully  done. The authors  have singled  out the unusual 
factors in this cyclical  episode and make plausible  estimates.  I like their 
approach,  but I think  that  the last word has not been said on this subject 
until more refined  calculations  have been made-calculations that are in 
the spirit  of their  investigation,  but  that  go more  deeply  into some  matters. 
This has not been a "usual"  cyclical downturn.  One should  therefore 
not necessarily  expect  to find  a more  serious  decline  in housing  starts  than 
what has occurred  thus far. The slide is just beginning.  To some extent, 
the adjustment  has been a matter  of timing,  and my estimate  is that  there 
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To be sure,  I do not expect  the decline  in housing  starts  to be as great 
as that  in 1974-75 but, at the same  time,  I do not expect  the recession  to 
be as deep as the previous  one. Also, nominal  mortgage  rates  in the cur- 
rent  inflationary  environment  do not have the same  meaning  to the pro- 
spective  home buyer  or landlord  as they have on several  previous  occa- 
sions of monetary  restriction.  The current  recession  is mixed in several 
ways;  it is not an across-the-board  adjustment  at this stage, and I am not 
surprised  that residential  construction  is one of the sectors that shows 
some  strength. 
Nevertheless,  the authors  are, in my opinion, correct in citing three 
dominant  factors  that offset recessionary  forces in the housing market: 
the demographics  of the "baby  boom" generation,  the attractiveness  of 
residential  real estate as an investment,  and the introduction  of money- 
market  certificates.  I think  that demographic  factors  have  been addressed 
in a reasonable  way. As for the two economic  factors, I think that the 
analysis  can  be fruitfully  pushed  further. 
In today's  inflationary  environment,  real estate values have held up 
well and most households-young persons and others-can  readily  see 
that residential  real estate should occupy an important  position in their 
wealth  portfolios.  A number  of interest  rates  are  appropriately  introduced 
as indicators  of alternative  investment  opportunities,  but careful  investi- 
gation of inflation,  equity rates, profit rates (incorporated  or unincor- 
porated), or other asset rates is not implemented.  Reference  is made to 
the unsuccessful  testing of real estate rates as explanatory  variables  in 
some  equations,  but that does not satisfy  me. I believe  that asset-demand 
functions  of households  should include the entire spectrum  of relevant 
rates  and  prices,  which  is the present  tendency  in econometric  research  on 
systems  of demand  functions. 
A conventional  approach-single-equation exploration  by ordinary 
multiple  regressions  like those  in the paper-will understandably  have  the 
usual  problems  of multicollinearity  and shortages  of degrees  of freedom, 
but parametric  specifications  of demand  systems  enable  one to deal with 
these  effectively.  Extensions  of the methods  of demand  systems  to wealth 
holding can be made.' The advantage  of this approach  is that one can 
obtain an estimate  of the effects among other asset prices or rates and 
1. See Mitsuo Saito, "Household Flow-of-Funds Equations: Specification and 
Estimation,"  Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 9 (February 1977), pt. 1, 
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home ownership.  However, I  am troubled  by the mixing of real and 
nominal  magnitudes  by the authors  in their  estimated  equations,  which  is 
particularly  misleading  today,  when  one feels intuitively  that  present  high 
mortgage  rates simply  are not as much  of a deterrent  as they would  have 
been  in other  epochs  of their  sample  period. 
The estimated  use of the unemployment  rate in the home ownership 
equation  2, and  the remark  that  borrowers  "seek  the largest  loan available 
based on their collateral"  do not seem to me to give an appropriate  role 
to expected  income,  particularly  its adequacy  to cover mortgage  service 
costs or other home-operating  expenses.  There is certainly  a limit to the 
amount of prudent borrowing,  accounting  for inflation, income, and 
property  value. The estimated  equations  do not properly address  this 
issue. 
The introduction  of money-market  certificates  did have an impact  on 
credit  availability  for the mortgage  market,  and  they are  new phenomena 
in the current  situation.  I admire  the authors'  calculations  for isolating 
their net contribution  to the maintenance  of the current  level of housing 
demand,  but the introduction  of money-market  certificates  was not the 
only structural  change  that affected  banking  by households  in the sample 
period or in the very recent  period.  Again, in the spirit  of looking at the 
entire  problem  and not the partial  problem  of limited  single-equation  re- 
gressions, there should be some assessment  of the expansion  of NOW 
accounts (negotiable  orders  of withdrawal),  introduction  of electronic 
funds transfers,  money-market  funds with check-writing  privileges,  tele- 
phone transfers,  and savings  accounts  with bill-paying  privileges.  These 
and similar  banking  innovations  have also had some impact  on the rnort- 
gage  resources  of thrift  institutions. 
The authors  correctly  reject casual empiricism,  which indicates  that 
money-market  certificates  have helped, and instead  provide  estimates  of 
magnitudes.  Their  estimates  are sufficiently  plausible,  and  I cannot  refute 
them by substituting  another  estimate,  but I do think  that, in accounting 
for the maintenance  of the present  level of housing,  they may  have incor- 
rectly  estimated  their  relationships  and possibly  attributed  more  power  to 
money-market  certificates  than is justified. 
Of lesser consequence  are some observations  on style, methodology, 
or interpretation.  All statistical  equations  are automatically  estimated 
with correction  for first-order  serial correlation  of residual  error,  which 
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small. I would have preferred  to have seen the estimates  without such 
correction  and  then  to have made a decision  on whether  to introduce  the 
correction  or some other respecification.  In dynamic  simulations  I have 
often  found  equations,  so corrected,  to cumulate  error  rapidly. 
The authors  note that  two variables  were collinear  in the estimation  of 
equation  3 and  therefore  one of the two was dropped  from the equation. 
This seems an arbitrary  procedure  for dealing  with the problem,  and it 
biases  the estimate  in favor  of the  variable  that  was  retained. 
The discussion  of nonprice  terms  associated  with  mortgage  loans does 
not seem to me to be appropriate.  A sensible  price  would  be the average 
monthly  payment,  which  can be expressed  as a formula  in terms  of down 
payments, length of  mortgage, and interest rate. Moreover, special 
"points"  charges  and repayment  penalties  can also be formulated  as part 
of the price.  Viewed  in this way, the so-called  nonprice  terms  are merely 
different  dimensions  of price and should  be incorporated  in the specifica- 
tion  as objectively  as the  more  conventional  price  terms. 
General  Discussion 
Anthony  Downs  was joined  by several  other  participants  in expressing 
surprise  that  the real  rate  of return  on housing  and  the real  interest  rate  on 
mortgages  failed to perform  in the equation  explaining  housing starts. 
Martin  Feldstein suggested  that the after-tax  real rate of interest on 
mortgages  would  be a more appropriate  variable  than the before-tax  rate 
that the authors  tried. Lawrence Summers  elaborated  on the various 
ways that tax considerations  favored investment in  owner-occupied 
housing  as an asset.  On the other  hand,  Martin  Baily  felt that  the nominal 
interest  rate on mortgages  remained  an important  determinant  of the 
level of  housing demand, because the nominal rate determines the 
monthly  payment.  Many borrowers  are liquidity-constrained,  and many 
lending  institutions  compare  the monthly  payment  with the borrower's 
income  to determine  credit worthiness.  Robert Hall and Franco Modi- 
gliani  amplified  the reasons  for believing  that the high rate of return  on 
housing  is an important  stimulus  to demand. Hall noted that, on the 
appropriate  after-tax  basis,  the rate  of appreciation  on houses  far  exceeded 
the interest  rate  on mortgages.  And he felt that  the rate  of return  on hous- 
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Modigliani  felt that  the authors  had  not convincingly  answered  the crucial 
question  of whether,  and  to what  extent,  the recent  resiliency  in residen- 
tial construction  reflected  availability  of funds,  rather  than  the high  return 
from  houses  due to the tax deductibility  of interest,  the outstanding  per- 
formance  of housing  as a hedge  against  inflation,  and  the resulting  specu- 
lative  fervor  in the housing  market.  His skepticism  about  the role assigned 
to credit availability  was reinforced  by the fact that, according  to the 
authors'  results,  most of that effect occurred  in the multifamily  sector, 
where  it would  be least expected. 
Arthur  Okun  asked  how the critics  who stressed  the high  rate  of return 
to investment  in housing  could account  for the reasonably  good fit of the 
equation  for housing  starts  in the paper.  The authors  found no mystery 
in the behavior  of single-family  starts  before the middle  of 1978. In re- 
sponse,  Benjamin  Friedman  argued  that  it was appropriate  to be skeptical 
of any equation  which omitted a class of variables  that on theoretical 
grounds  ought  to be important,  even  if it tracks  well. Jaffee  suggested  that 
the failure  of an expected  appreciation  variable  to perform  significantly 
might  reflect  the fact that the equations  were explaining  the number  of 
housing  starts  rather  than the real value of the units built. But Feldstein 
argued  that both the real value and the number  of units ought to be in- 
fluenced  by the  prospective  rate  of return. 
Several  suggestions  were  made  for improved  specification  of the model. 
John Shoven felt that repayments  of existing mortgages  should be in- 
cluded  as a source  of funds in the variable  for mortgage  availability;  he 
noted  that  repayments  should  also respond  to variations  in interest  rates. 
Peter Clark  cautioned  that the equations  that include both corrections 
for autocorrelation  in the error term and a lagged dependent  variable 
had  to be interpreted  with care. Clark  said that the procedure  might  lead 
to an overly  long estimated  lag in the adjustment  coefficient  and  suggested 
that  other  specifications  be tried. 
James Tobin proposed an alternative  approach  relying on a stock, 
asset-demand  function  to explain  the price  of existing  houses, and then a 
flow-supply  equation  to explain how many houses are built by relating 
these prices  to the relevant  wages and other construction  costs. Dwight 
Jaffee pointed out, however, that the model was essentially demand 
driven,  because  it assumed  a constant-cost,  horizontal  supply  function. 
Jaffee  observed  that, in fact, the boom in prices for existing  houses was 
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that this phenomenon  was particularly  marked  in California.  William 
Fellner  also saw the desirability  of a stock-demand  approach.  According 
to data  he had  studied,  the  value  of housing  as a ratio  to disposable  income 
has been rising  in nominal  terms and falling in real terms. To explain 
that, one should  want to estimate  the income elasticity,  price elasticity, 
and  importance  of expectations  of capital  gains. 
With  respect  to multifamily  units,  Feldstein  remarked  that  government 
programs  outside  the credit  area  should  be taken  into account.  In particu- 
lar, government  provision  of multiunit  housing  in the early 1970s might 
have  been important  in the bulge and subsequent  decline in multifamily 
starts. 
The discussion  also highlighted  the need for better modeling  of the 
behavior  of thrift  institutions.  Jaffee was receptive  to Lawrence  Klein's 
suggestion  that the demand  of thrift  institutions  for deposits  be modeled 
in a system  of equations.  Daniel  Brill,  Friedman,  and  Tobin  discussed  the 
difficulties  of determining  the objectives  of thrift  institutions,  since most 
were  not standard  profit-seeking  corporations. 
Several  participants  felt that, in addition  to money-market  certificates 
and  federal  agency  credit,  other  factors  may have been important  in sus- 
taining  home  building  in 1978-79. Feldstein  mentioned  mortgage-backed 
bonds; Downs, the removal of usury ceilings on interest rates; David 
Fand, the use of "jumbo"  certificates  of deposit and commercial  paper 
by the thrift  institutions;  and Friedman,  the heavy investments  in mort- 
gages made by the commercial  banks. Downs also reported  that equal 
rights  legislation  had forced  lenders  to weigh  the incomes  of both spouses 
equally,  thereby  making  mortgage  credit  more  readily  available  to them. 
Downs commented  that the money-market  certificate  was one tool of 
government  policy that had clearly  succeeded  in achieving  its objective. 
But he voiced some concern  that the support  it provided  to the housing 
market  may  have added  to the inflation  rate.  John  Kareken  felt, however, 
that  the misallocation  costs caused  by the former  policies  of squeezing  the 
mortgage  market  had to be weighed  against  the additional  inflation  costs. 
And Feldstein  interpreted  the money-market  certificate  as a relaxation  of 
government  constraints  on financial  markets;  its effectiveness  showed  that 
policy  can succeed  when it frees markets. 